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GARVEY*

Introduction

International refugee law is being tested as never before. The legal
systems in place for asylum determination, resettlement, or repatriation, socalled "durable solutions" to refugee crises, are severely stressed and often
overwhelmed. Commentators commonly cast refugee law and its
procedures as relics of the post-World War II management of the migratory
consequences of the Nazi persecutions-as conceived within a relatively
homogeneous European culture, unfit to the challenges of contemporary
migrations that now occur on a global scale.
Though the legal foundation for response to refugee migrations remains
the Refugee Convention of 1951 (Refugee Convention), international
refugee law appears to be increasingly irrelevant to what refugees do, and to
what states do in response to refugee movements.' Migrants ignore the
rules, charging across borders as best they can in desperate attempts to
achieve security and better lives. National governments react by giving
priority to deterrence strategies and tighter border control, as evidenced
most dramatically today by the closing of the Balkan Route during the socalled "European Refugee Crisis" and "the wall" proposed for the U.S.Mexico border. This is done not only through enhancements of national
law, but also through new efforts to implement regional deals and bilateral
deals on migration and border regulation.
International refugee law and the institution directly charged with its
administration, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), have evolved to adjust well beyond origins of the postWorld War II context of the Nazi persecutions. And the UNHCR is only
one among a mix of many international organizations that have evolved to
deal with mass migration. Others include the International Migration
Organization, informal networks such as The Intergovernmental
Consultations on Migration, Asylum, and Refugees (IGC), and numerous
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The UNHCR, as the most
prominent institutionalized administration, has grown to an agency of over
10,000 staff and administers a broad range of protective services, including
* Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1968;
A.B., Harvard College, 1964.
1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3 3(1), openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 150.
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refugee camps, some containing hundreds of thousands of human beings.2
UNHCR was not intended to be an operational humanitarian agency, but
has adapted as necessary to try and fill the need. As for law, it is no longer
only the Refugee Convention that governments and NGOs apply, but a
hybrid comprised not just of refugee law, but also norms of humanitarian
law concerning humane protection and human rights law directed to values
of human dignity.
Inherent to legal response to mass migration, however, is a severe tension.
On one side are the aspirations and imprecations of refugee law, human
rights, and humanitarian law. On the other is national sovereignty and
national political culture, wherein mass migration is increasingly perceived
as threatening domestic order and constituting back-door avoidance of
national control over immigration.
The following analysis argues that the Refugee Convention has been, and
continues to be, serviceable in its fundamental design-that provides a viable
framework for reconciling sovereignty with the imprecations of
humanitarian and human rights norms. The essential thrust of the
Convention is to reconcile sovereign interest with these normative
standards. There is, indeed, despite the challenge, still virtually universal
acknowledgement of the most fundamental rights enshrined in the
Convention. The principle of non-refoulement3 and concomitant rights of
asylum remain the normative framework on which states depend for
legitimacy in response to mass influx. There is still consensus among states
that supports the principles of non-refoulement and the right to asylum as
universal and absolute, even to the extent that non-refoulement is claimed to
be of the status ofjus cogens.4 Refoulement, when it does occur, is invariably
accompanied by protest as the referent norm for state conduct.5
2. About Us, UNHCR, http://www.unrefugees.org/about-us/ (last accessed Feb. 5, 2018).
3. "Non-refoulement" refers to the hallmark principle of international refugee law,
enshrined in the Refugee Convention, that no contracting stay may refouler a refugee. To
refouler a refugee means "expel or return ... a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Refugee Convention,
supra note 1, at art. 33(1). The Right to Asylum comes from Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "[elveryone has the right to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution." G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, at art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
4. Cases from the European Court of Human Rights acknowledge as much. See Hirsi Jamaa
v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (2012) (De Albuquerque, J. concurring), http://hudoc.echr
.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001 -109231 &filename=001 -109231 .pdf;
Nada v. Switzerland, 2012-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 213 (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conver
sion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-113118&filename=001-113118.pdf.
5. See Poland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia: Pushed Back at the Door, EUR.
COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.ecre.org/poland-bulgariaczech-republic-hungary-and-slovenia-pushed-back-at-the-door/ and its associated report from
five European Refugee Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGO"). Moreover, the
international human rights community is wary of any fundamental reconstruction of the
Convention for fear it would be retrograde for non-refoulement, if done in the current climate of

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20181

FUTURE LEGAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS MIGRATION

123

But for refugee law to address contemporary mass migration, it must no
doubt meet the challenges of a distinctly new dimension. That new
dimension is the global confrontation of economic, cultural, and other
previously contained disparities that now intersect in explosive
reconfiguration of human beings on this planet. Approximately one in every
113 people will be involved in such migrations, per the June 2016 estimate of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees-upwards of 65,000,000 human
beings.6 Multitudes of people migrate, fleeing political failure and war, the
impacts of global warming, economic disparity, and global environmental
degradation, generating tectonic tears that rip through the fabric of human
communities.
Therefore, for refugee law to be relevant today, it must be an enterprise of
designing anticipatory systems to accommodate disruptive population flow
on a scale and kind never encountered. Today, even the principle of nonrefoulement is being challenged. When the Refugee Convention came to be
in 1951, there was little foreseeing the political, economic, and
environmental drivers that today go well beyond personal persecution.
Today, mass migrations include a mix of motivations; a migrant fleeing his
country due to a "well-founded fear of persecution" certainly fits the
definition in the Refugee Convention, but also migrants are fleeing because
of economic and environmental forces and encounter state interests that
vary broadly in their substance and intensity. Refugee law must now
comprehend the entirety of this extraordinary mix.
The analytical need, therefore, is a lens, a refinement of perspective to
understand and improve the legal management of mass migrations, wide
enough to comprehend the scope of the challenge, but discerning enough to
account for the inherent complexity and diversity of the problems and
available response strategies. The objective of this paper is to provide that
lens.
terrorism induced insecurity, and its companion psychoses, resurgent nationalism and
xenophobia. See James C. Hathaway, A Global Solution to a Global Refugee Crisis, 1 EUROPEAN
PAPERS 93, 93-99 (2016), available at http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/e-journal/globalsolution-global-refugee-crisis.
6. U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, at 2
(June 20, 2016), www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf (reporting that 65.3 million individuals
worldwide were displaced by the end of 2015 because of persecution, conflict, generalized
violence, and human rights abuses).
7. The Refugee Convention defines someone as a refugee as someone:
[W]ho owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1(A)(2).
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Today's challenge is not the Sisyphean task of establishing a fundamentally
different international refugee law regime in today's fundamentally
unreceptive political climate. The challenge is largely one of managerial
skill and its legal implementation. The challenge is to harness sovereign
interest and migrant choice, such that they are and may be, in current and
future political winds, for the service of humanitarian, human rights, and
other humane social objectives. Ultimately sovereignty rules, and any
prescription for management of contemporary mass migration that fails to
account for the concerns of state power and control is doomed to failure. It
is the parallel and irreducible reality, though, that migrants will choose legal
or illegal means depending on their own risks versus benefits assessments.
Because migrants are human beings already in extremis, push-back through
police repression of movement and other barriers to staunch the flow is
prescription for failure. One way or another, people desperate for security
will move. Risk and repression may stymy migration for economic
motivations alone, but people will move if under serious threat. To the
degree legal systems do not provide pathways to safety, including economic
security, migrants will find their own way and are willing to risk great loss.
We all see, in tragic scenes played out daily in global media, that failing to
provide adequate legal process not only leads to the growth of smuggler
networks and the attendant disastrous human trafficking and exploitation,
but also alienation that feeds the scourge of contemporary terrorism.8
It is the argument here that success in management of mass migration
depends most of all on maximal reconciliation of the two key dynamics of
modern mass migration: migrant choice and state interest. Though the
dynamics of migrant choice and state interest may appear at odds, and often
are, the record of mass migration in our time demonstrates the critical
significance of these considerations and illustrates that a successful response
can only be achieved by working towards reconciling these often-conflicting
interests.
8. Human smuggling into Europe, according to Europol-Interpol, generated five to six
billion Euros in 2015. Europol & Interpol, Migrant Smuggling Networks -Joint Europol-Interpol
Report - Executive Summary, at 8 (May 2016), https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/
publications/ep-ip_reportexecutive-summary.pdf. The EU received about 951,000 first time
asylum applications in the first nine months of 2016, and the Overseas Development Institute
("ODI") estimates that more than half arrived clandestinely. This indicates that strengthening
border controls has not had a transformative impact other than increasing illegal entry and risk
taking by migrants. Thomas Ruttig, Afghan Exodus: Afghan Asylum Seekers in Europe (1)-The
Changing Situation, AFGHAN ANALYST NETWORK (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.afghanistananalysts.org/afghan-exodus-afghan-asylum-seekers-in-europe- 1 -the-changing-situation. As of
December 14, 2016, 4,831 migrants died that calendar year compared with 3,771 in 2015.
Helen Dempster, Migration to Europe: Latest Statistics and New Trends, ODI (Dec. 14, 2016),
https://www.odi.org/comment/10473-migration-europe-latest-statistics-and-new-trends.
Particularly of note, the EU-Turkey deal lowering the number of asylum seekers along the
Balkan route has been countered by a dramatic increase in the number of migrants using the
more dangerous Central Mediterranean routes, via Egypt or Libya by boat, during the same
period. Nina N. Sorensen et al., Europe and the Refugee Situation-Human Security.
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This paper will proceed with that demonstration. First it will examine,
through the lens of state interest and migrant choice, the contemporary
"European Refugee Crisis." Then, that same lens will be applied to past
principal mass migrations that elicited a collective response since the
foundation of modern refugee law in 1951. Among these collective
responses are the International Conference on Central American Refugees
(The COREFCA Process) (1987-1995), the response to the refugee crisis of
the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, The International Conferences on Assistance
to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) (1981 and 1984), and the Comprehensive
Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (The CPA) (1988-1996).
The thesis of this article-that the best reconciliation of migrant choice
with state interest is what determines the degree of success in managing
mass migration-does not deny the significance of humanitarian and human
rights principles. But, the principles of human dignity are best envisioned as
ends, not to be confused with the means for their realization. Historical
experience confirms that neither concern for the indignity of migrant
suffering nor altruism are the primary drivers of "durable solutions," and
that acknowledgment and respect for the realities of migrant choice and
state interest is the best guide for management of mass migration.
There is a large body of literature accumulated in recent decades
proposing various management schemes for dealing with mass migration.
Yet, no comprehensive system has achieved implementation as a coherent
and comprehensive international approach. The lack of success can largely
be attributed to the failure of the various schemes to accommodate what
migrants and governments chose to do in contrast to their perceived
interests. Neither the instincts of repression nor altruism that play in
governmental response succeed in overcoming that reality. It is, indeed, by
examining the major episodes of mass migration under the lens of migrant
choice and state interest-including the situation currently most on point,
the so-called9 "European Crisis"-that the parameters for success, and for
failure, can be best understood.
II. Denial of Refugee Choice and State Interest in The
European Refugee Crisis
The European Refugee Crisis presents the most immediate and
compelling demonstration that migrants under severe pressure will choose
greater safety, social and cultural ties, and economic promise, whatever the
threat their arrival in large numbers may present for the destination state.
And as legal channels narrow or disappear, the more they will move beyond
9. The so-called "European Crisis" in that Europeans and others often see the crisis as "An
American Refugee Crisis" resulting from the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ironically so-called
"Arab Spring" it engendered. See generally Refugees, THE EcONOMIST, June 25, 2011, at 109
(attributing many of the world's refugees to America's wars); Scott Anderson, FracturedLands,
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 2016 (narrating the catastrophe of the Arab world since the Iraq
invasion, leading to the refugee crisis).
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regulation and choose to cast their fate into what has become a multibillion-dollar human smuggling industry.
It is true that in the post-VvWII context, resettlement and refugee law was
primarily about intra-European immigration and did not raise the issues of
culture clash that embroil the current "European Crisis." Governments of
resettlement specifically recruited European immigrants, not only to achieve
ethnic balance and skilled labor, but also as expression of moral obligation to
care for the victims of the war in Europe. Human rights were center-stage,
but in a common cultural context. Today, though there is surely much to be
said for moral obligation incumbent on the United States and other states in
relation to their role in generating conflict in the Middle East, any moral
imperative is at best secondary to migrants choosing the imperative of
survival in alien lands, and the interests of the governments, grappling with
consequent social and economic instability.
To the extent state interest has played a role in the response by the
European Union (EU), it has been largely manifest as downward
harmonization, by way of restriction, exclusion, and diminishment of human
rights. The evolution of the EU's "Frontex" agency for border control and
compacts with African and Middle-Eastern states to diminish the flow are
among the most prominent aspects in the implementation of this decline.
But, the flow to Europe continues, though more and more clandestine,
resulting in hundreds of thousands of refugees rejecting conditions of
containment, boarding boats in dangerous seas, and otherwise making their
way across land routes into Europe.1o Migrants under pressure for survival
do not wait for the legal process and legally validated resettlement
opportunities. They are moving not only through smuggling networks, but
also are self-directed, using technological innovations to run around national
governmental controls by means such as Facebook, GPS instruments, and
other mobile technology.
The question, therefore, is how state interest and migrant choice may be
better engaged so that migrants will instead choose legal means. Established
refugee law sets only very broad parameters for legal means. There is no
obligation under international refugee law for states to consider the
preferences of an individual migrant, nor the interests of impacted states.
Under applicable principles, when making a transfer," a government must

&

10. The evidence is that the magnitude of the flow, while changing routings, is increasing,
along with the related deaths of migrants at sea. In 2016, about 180,000 migrants crossed over
to Europe through the Central Mediterranean route. By April 2017, arrivals increased 24
percent over the total for all of 2016. In 2016, 4,500 people died attempting the crossing, and
that number was also exceeded by April 2017. The head of Frontex, the newly organized
institutionalization of collective European frontier control, declared, "[w]e have never had so
many vessels deployed to save lives and we have never had so many deaths." Drew Hinshaw
Pietro Lombardi, World News: MigrantToll Rises as QuarrelsHinderRescue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18,
2017, at All.
11. The right to make a transfer is incorporated under Article 32 of the Refugee Convention.
Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at art. 32.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018]

FUTURE LEGAL MANAGEMENT OF MASS MIGRATION

127

simply consider the risk of entry denial to the transferee state and the risk of
refoulement, including whether basic rights as referenced under the Refugee
Convention will be put at risk. Under EU law, asylum seekers have no right
to choose the member state of relocation.12 Although, there is a provision
that member states should take into account integration prospects such as
skills and other qualifications in determining an individual's relocation.3
Relocation procedures that include such a measure of asylum seeker
preference are exceptions to the EU's standard "Dublin System" (Dublin
System or Dublin Regulation) of refugee regulation, which does not
normally allow for expression of individual preferences.'4 The Dublin
Regulation does not allow migrants to express preferences other than by
meeting certain criteria such as family unification.5 There are elements of
migrant choice in some national asylum systems, such as the criteria of
family unification, that may be applied in asylum determination, temporary
protection, or relocation. But, neither under EU law nor under
international refugee law is there any mandate to consider migrant choice as
a priority for consideration in asylum proceedings, temporary protection, or
any legal process for relocation.
The legal scheme that the EU established for migration management has,
indeed, consistently denied the significance of migrant choice. The
European system, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), is also
designed to deny differentiated state interest. It allows for differentiation of
governmental action only insofar that it determines which EU member state
is responsible for examining an individual's application.16 The CEAS
12. See Council Decision 2015/1523, 2015 O.J. (L 239) 146 (EU) (establishing provisional
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and/or Greece)
[hereinafter Relocation Decision]. Under the Relocation Decision, the applicant's consent is
specifically excluded from consideration. This is an explicit derogation from the Asylum Fund
Regulation which allows for the transfer of applicants for international protection between EU
member states with asylum seekers' consent. See Regulation 516/2014, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 establishing the Asylum, Migration, and
Integration Fund, art. 7(2), 2014 O.J. (L 150) 168 [hereinafter the Asylum Fund Regulation].
13. Relocation Decision, supra note 12, at Recital 28.
14. Such measures constitute a derogation from Article 13(1) of the Dublin Regulation, which
provides that the first Member State that an asylum seeker enters is responsible for their
application. Regulation 604/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June
2013 establishing criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a
third-county national or stateless person, art. 13(1), 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31 [hereinafter the
Dublin Regulation].
15. Dublin Regulation, supra note 14, at art. 9.
16. The "Dublin System," beginning with the Dublin Convention in 1990, generally
established that the Member State asylum applicant first entered would be the country
responsible for an asylum claim. The Treaty of Amsterdam authorized the European
Commission to legislate on asylum issues, which resulted in a series of directives aimed at
harmonizing asylum procedures in Europe. The European Refugee Fund was created in 2000
for sharing costs of refugee hosting among Member States, and the Fund continued after 2014
as the "Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund" (see Asylum Fund Regulation, supra note 12).
Other programs and agencies were also established to achieve harmonization, such as the
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establishes that the state of first arrival determines the category of
international protection that applies; in making this determination, the state
reviews whether the "applicant is in possession of a valid residence
document" (e.g., as a visa or residence permit) and ascertains whether the
applicant has entered the EU irregularly or regularly.'7 The asylum official
of the state of first arrival also determines if the criteria for transferring the
applicant to a safe third country (pursuant to the Asylum Procedures
Directive) are satisfied.1s If it is concluded that the criteria for transfer to a
safe third country does not apply, the asylum official may also consider
whether the criteria for transferring the applicant to a first country of asylum
apply.19 Both mechanisms are ways by which an EU member state can
summarily deny an application for asylum, and both were used as
justifications for the EU/Turkey/Greece deal that was declared in March
2016 to control the mass influx.20

On May 4, 2016, the European Commission introduced a proposal to
reform the current Dublin Regulation to create what is sometimes called a
"Dublin TV." The idea was to update the Dublin Regulation to alleviate the
burden it placed on EU-border states such as Greece. It included the
proposal to create a "reference key" that would allow border states to
transfer their responsibilities to other EU member states when they were
overloaded, based upon certain objective criteria, such as GDP and
population.21
But, the overall thrust of the proposed changes was to further foreclose
migrant choice and preclude any diversified recognition of state interest.
The European Parliament declared, in reviewing the Dublin IV Proposal,
that refugee preferences must be considered in the relocation and
resettlement procedures for them to be successful.22 Yet, nowhere did the

Dublin IV Proposal accommodate migrant choice. Moreover, the Dublin
IV Proposal's "reference key" did not allow states to express their
preferences. The reference key enlists wholly objective criteria such as GDP
European Dactyloscopy (EuroDac) in 2003, for fingerprinting and border control; Frontex in
2005, for border control; and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in 2011, for
implementing coherent asylum procedures.
17. Dublin Regulation, supra note 14, at art. 12-13.
18. Directive 2013/32/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, art. 33(c), 2013
O.J. (L 180) 60, 79 [hereinafter Procedures Directive].
19. Procedures Directive, supra note 18, at art. 33(b), 79.
20. European Commission Press Release MEMO/16/963, EU-Turkey Statement: Questions
and Answers, (Mar. 19, 2016).
2 1. Commission Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliamentand of the Council Establishing
the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an
Application for International Protection Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country
National or a Stateless Person (recast), art. 37, COM (2016) 270 final (May 4, 2016) [hereinafter
the Dublin IV Proposal].
22. Francesco Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation, at 34, EUR. PARLIAMENT,
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, POLICY DEPARTMENT C-CITIZEN'S
RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (June 2016).
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and population, and does not afford state variation beyond the option of
paying an in-lieu fee of C250,000 for every asylum allocation it chooses to
reject.
"Dublin IV" is replete with downward harmonization diminishing
migrant choice, denying any individualization of the asylum application
process. The proposal includes provisions that there "should" rather than
"shall" be personal interviews and legal safeguards and the right to effective
remedy for asylum applicants. This is notwithstanding that the Refugee
Convention establishes a right to be heard in Article 32(2), and the right to
an effective remedy under Article 16(1) (a right also guaranteed under the
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).23 Dublin IV would also add a burden
on the claimant to submit "all the elements and information relevant for
determining the member state responsible" by a pre-determined deadline, a
burden not feasible for most migrants who typically are without
documentation due to their desperate flight.24
The earlier European response to the massive flow of persons from Syria,
Iraq, Afghanistan, and other traumatized geographies south of European
borders ranged widely from the welcoming policies of Germany to the
barbed fences of Hungary. Eventually, however, there did emerge a
''common" response from the governments along the Balkan route of the
migration flow. That response culminated in the EU/Turkey/Greece deal,
tightening the European external border at the major European entry point
of Turkey to Greece transit.25
A principal innovation, thus, conjoined with "Dublin IV" became the socalled "hot-spot" model, exemplified by the EU/Turkey/Greece deal. The
"hot-spot" model is to concentrate initial arrivals at one location with a
prospect of either return or resettlement. Yet, it is a model that invites
human rights abuse and has been widely denounced by a panoply of NGOs
and other human rights organizations. Those who work hands-on with the
mass migration have observed that the "hot-spots" have become de facto
detention centers with processes so slow and unattractive they are essentially
designed to incarcerate and deter further migration.26 In particular, there
has been compelling demonstrations that the overall human rights record of
Turkey, in its treatment of migrants, cannot with any credibility be
23. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Oct. 26, 2012, art. 47, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 391.
24. Explanatory Memorandum to the Dublin IV Proposal, at 5, COM (2016) 270 Final (May 4,
2016).
25. Effective March 20, 2016, Turkey agreed to accept all irregular migrants crossing to
Greece from Turkey and took steps to stop further migration. In return, the EU agreed to
resettle one Syrian refugee in Turkey for every Syrian sent back. The resettlements would
begin once irregular migration from Turkey ceased substantially. Further, the EU agreed to lift
visa requirements for Turkish citizens by the end of June 2016, "re-energize" Turkey's EU
admissions process, disburse C3 billion to Turkey for housing refugees, and disburse another C3
billion by 2018. European Commission Memoranda MEMO/16/963, supra note 20.
26. See Amnesty Int'l, No Safe Refuge: Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in
Turkey, at 5, 19-29, Al Index EUR 44/3825/2016 (June 3, 2016) [hereinafter No Safe Refuge].
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characterized as that of a "safe third country." Migrants have not only been
subjected to physical abuse by Turkish police at Turkey's borders, but also it
is now well documented that migrants forced to return to Turkey as part of
the EU-Turkey deal have been subjected to a range of human rights abuses
(e.g. labor exploitation).27
The EU/Turkey/Greece scheme was touted by the EU as consistent with
applicable law and was officially declared not to constitute "mass
expulsion."28 But, it was surely at odds with the requirements of
international refugee law and with the rule of law as the juridical concept is
defined for Europe. And the ultimate result, now on a massive scale, is the
violation of the cardinal principle of international refugee law, nonrefoulement (notwithstanding the governmental denials of illegality). The
scheme not only effectually closed any open routes to Europe, but also it has
facilitated avoidance of legal responsibility for the impacted governments.
By focusing the European response on Turkey to Greek transit and by
directing media attention to the European external border transit points, the
question of legal responsibility was largely avoided (though it was de facto
refoulement).
The EU/Turkey/Greece deal proved flawed under applicable refugee law
and in its implementation. There has been only minor implementation of
the deal's proposed resettlement and return processes, though resettlement
was touted as a principal element. As of May 3, 2017, after more than a year
of implementation, only 1,895 of the many tens of thousands of migrants
situated in Europe had been returned to Turkey under the scheme's one-toone mechanism.29 Thus, from the perspective of human rights and
humanitarian law, the result has been betrayal on a massive scale. The EU/
Turkey/Greece deal transmuted Greece during 2016 from a main location
for arrivals seeking protection to a venue for detention, with resettlement
becoming a false promise for most of the migrants.
Today, news travels quickly within migrant communities who, like many
other human communities, have access to cell phones and other modern
communications technologies. Thus, the EU/Turkey/Greece deal was soon
understood by migrants to offer little prospect of safe resettlement;
consequently, even while EU officials proclaimed success, the number of
new arrivals diminished.
In fact, the EU/Turkey/Greece deal was an attempt to influence migrant
choice by deterrence without significantly enlarging any legal option. Its
thesis was that increasing returns would drive the price and risk high enough
27. See Amnesty Int'l, Turkey: Illegal Mass Returns of Syrian Refugees Expose FatalFlaws in EUTurkey Deal (Apr. 1, 2016); Amnesty Int'l, supra note 26.
28. The European Council declared as fundamental to the deal that return "will take place in
full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion."
Amnesty Int'l, Turkey, supra note 27.
29. See Operational Implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, STATE WATCH, http://www
.statewatch.org/news/2 017/sep/eu-com-eu-turkey-resett-returns.pdf (last visited Nov. 10,
2017). See also European Commission Memorandum MEMO/16/963, supra note 20.
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to dissuade migrants from employing smugglers.30 In the second progress
report of the European Commission on the implementation of the EU/
Turkey/Greece Agreement, the Commission asserted that "[t]he sharp
decrease in the number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers crossing
from Turkey into Greece is proof of the Statement's [EU/Turkey/Greece
deal's] effectiveness-and in particular that the business model of smugglers
can be broken."31 The intended message to migrants was, therefore, that
getting on a boat in Turkey and endangering one's life in the process was not
worth the risk. But, NGO examination of the arrivals before and after
implementation of the agreement concluded that "[i]n sum, the EU-Turkey
Agreement has no identifiable influence on the overall declining number of
crossings in the Aegean."32 The relevant numbers indicate it led to a
temporary increase in the weeks before it was concluded, and there is no
question it led to other increase in irregular movement.33
The contradiction between what was done and what international refugee
law requires is still there. The flaws in the European response simply came
to fruition in the EU/Turkey/Greece deal. Before long, the illegality and
consequent illegitimacy became a matter of debate and deep concern, as
evidenced, for example, by the public withdrawal of UNHCR, the
Norwegian Refugee council, Oxfam, and Medecins Sans Frontiers from any
participation in the morphing of so-called "hotspots" into de facto detention
centers.34
Indeed, the EU/Turkey/Greece deal failed fundamentally to comport with
international refugee law and EU law. The governments involved made
clear that the determination of persons who can apply for asylum is based on
nationality. Eligibility has been restricted to persons who can establish, as
country of origin, Syria, Iraq, or for a time, Afghanistan. The ostensible
justification for nationality as a criterion is that these states of origin all are
places of civil war and violence. But, turning refugee status on nationality
alone ipso facto constitutes violation of international refugee law and EU
law. EU primary law incorporates many aspects of international refugee
law, such as non-refoulement, to be administered on an individualized
30. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council and the European Investment Bank on Establishinga New PartnershipFramework with Third
Countries Under the European Agenda on Migration, at 6-7, COM (2016) 385 Final (June 7, 2016).
31. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council and the Council Second Report on the progress made in the implementation of the
EU-Turkey Statement, at 2, COM (2016) 349 Final (June 15, 2016).
32. Thomas Spijkerboer, Fact Check: Did the EU-Turkey Deal Bring Down the Number of
Migrants and of Border Deaths? OXFORD LAW FACULTY: BORDER CRIMINOLOGIES (Sept. 28,
2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centrebordercriminologies/blog/2016/09/fact-check-did-eu.
33. Id.
34. See UNHCR Redefines Role in Greece as EU-Turkey Deal Comes into Effect, U.N. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (Mar. 22, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/
2016/3/56fl0d049/unhcr-redefines-role-greece-eu-turkey-deal-comes-effect.html.
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basis.35 EU primary law also embodies principles such as nondiscrimination6 and contains a prohibition on collective expulsion of
aliens.37 The EU law mandates an individualized examination of the
circumstances of each applicant for international protection.38 The EU
qualification Directives for refugee status similarly provide for equal access
to international protection.39 Having refugee status recognition turn on any
group identity, whether nationality, race, or any classification of ethnicity, is
clearly prohibited. Non-discrimination in the management of mass
migration is also fundamental under international refugee law. Article 3 of
the Refugee Convention provides that the Convention will be applied to
refugees "without discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin."o
Thus, the individual right to be heard established in Article 32(2) of The
Refugee Convention mandates the proper response to the real circumstances
of mass influx, notwithstanding actual implementation of the "Dublin
System" that determines EU migration management.4' The response, it is
clear, must be individualized under the applicable law.
Individuals fleeing states where there is armed conflict may or may not
satisfy the core requirement that justifies grant of asylum under the Refugee
Convention.42 Moreover, within any of the favored classes based on state of
origin, whether Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or any other state, there will be
persons emigrating from areas that are relatively conflict-free. There will
also be individuals from relatively conflict-free states where localized
violence may constitute the most virulent persecution based on race or
35. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of Oct. 26,
2012, art. 78, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 76 (EU) [hereinafter TFEU].
36. Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible
for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, Recitals 17 & 45, 2011
O.J. (L 337) [hereinafter Qualification Directive].
37. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 23, at art. 47; Protocol
No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other than those Already Included in the Convention
and in the First Protocol thereto, art. 5, opened for signature Sept. 16, 1963, C.E.T.S. 4.
38. Procedures Directive, supra note 18, at art. 10(3)(a).
39. Qualification Directive, supra note 36, at art. 32.
40. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
41. For an in-depth analysis of these deficiencies, see Jenny Poon, The EU Commission on
'Dublin IV: Sufficient Safeguardsfor Asylum Claimants?, 5 ESIL REFLECTIONS, no. 9, 2016, at 1;
Europe Tries to Buy its Way Out of the Migration Crisis, IRIN NEWS, June 30, 2016, http://www
.irinnews.org/analysis/2016/06/30/europe-tries-buy-its-way-out-migration-crisis. Indeed, there
are already indications that the proposal that payments to third countries for preventing
migrations are "fine" is being both accepted and rejected by EU member states. Steve Peers,
The Orbanisationof EUAsylum Law: The Latest EUAsylum Proposals,EU LAw ANALYSIS (May 6,
2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/05/the-orbanisation-of-eu-asylum-law.html.
42. The status of 'refugee' is determined on the basis of "well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion." Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1(2).
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religion, or local gang or tribal conflict. Accordingly, international law and
EU law require the individualization of the determination of who is a
refugee. The individual right to be heard simply reflects the undeniable
reality of the necessarily individualized nature of refugee status, both legal
and empirical. Thus, as the European Court of Human Rights has
reiterated, through a long line of cases, that return of third country nationals
requires an assessment of personal circumstances, and that any group
identification alone, whether nationality or otherwise, does not satisfy the
prohibition on collective expulsions in Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the
European Charter of Human Rights.43 The European Procedures
Directives similarly specifically require individualized determination44
By turning eligibility on national origin, the current European system is in
violation of the basic principle barring collective expulsion under both
international refugee law and European law.45 A refusal to acknowledge as

legitimate applications for asylum, other than by individuals from certain
pre-designated states, ipso facto constitutes collective expulsion.46
Altogether then, the EU/Turkey/Greece deal and the "hotspot" model it
has engendered amount to gross violation of the applicable international and
EU standards. The current system cannot be saved because it is so
fundamentally flawed, not only about the applicable law, but also
institutionally for the EU. The deal, as an agreement of the EU with a third
country, i.e., Turkey, is contestable as a breach of Article 218 TFEU as
bypassing necessary consultation with the European Parliament, raising the
question of rule of law and democratic accountability. Moreover, even if the
current state of affairs is regarded as only a series of measures by the
different states that comprised the Balkan route and the EU/Turkey/Greece
deal (the suggestion of the dealmakers in characterizing it as only a
"statement" of policy),47 the collusive behavior involved-in its ultimate
consequence, being de facto refoulement-violates the most fundamental
principle of international refugee law. Indeed, EU officials have been
remarkably incautious in embracing infringement of non-refoulement. The
43. See HirsiJamaa, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (2012) (De Albuquerque, J. concurring), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-109231&filename=001-10923
1.pdf.
44. The directives guarantee an applicant's right to retain effective legal aid, Procedures
Directive, supra note 18, at art. 22(1); the right to appeal adverse decisions against them in a
court or tribunal, Id. at art. 46(1)(a); the right to be granted a stay of any expulsion during
appeal, Id. at art. 46(5); the right to be provided with free legal aid by member states during
appeal, Id. at art. 20(1); and the right to be accessed by legal counsel, even if the applicant is
being held in a closed area, Id. at art. 23(2).
45. Refugee Convention, supra note 1, at art. 31-33.
46. Collective expulsion occurs when a state processes migrants on a group identity basis that
fails to afford opportunity to apply for individually determined international protection before
sending irregular migrants to a country that may not be safe for them. Hirsijamaa, supra note
43, at 159-186.
47. See EU-Turkey Statement, supra note 31.
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EU's Migration Chief has stated: "[a]sylum seekers need to know they can't
relocate themselves and that if they do so they will be sent back."48
So, also as an empirical matter, the legal flaws of the European response to
its migrant crisis demonstrate a pervasive unwillingness to address, let alone
reconcile, the key dynamics of migrant choice and the state interests
involved. The current policies, notwithstanding present and proposed
revisions, do not relieve the frontier states of their inability to meet the
challenge with available resources and send a decisive message to the
migrants that they are assuredly at risk if they seek legal channels.

III. Migrant Choice and State Interest in Four Major Mass
Migrations
The history of attempts to manage mass migration also demonstrate that
the quality of accommodation of separate state interest and migrant choice is
what determines success or failure. We see this particularly evident, both in
scope and significance, in four of the most compelling episodes that have
occurred since the post-World War II refugee influx that was the original
template for the Refugee Convention. These four episodes of mass
migration were addressed by the international community via the following:
(1) the International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (1981
and 1984); (2) the International Conference on Central American Refugees
(1987-1995); (3) the collective response to the refugee emergency generated
by the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s; and (4) the
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees (1988-1996).
Though each of these episodes could be described as ad hoc and regional,
they have in common the generation of an international effort to achieve an
international solution. Some of these efforts went so far as establishing the
number of migrants that concerned governments should accept, migrant
benefits, and uniformity of refugee status determination. Some went no
further than the setting of joint objectives. But, as to each of these four
major episodes of mass migration, to a lesser or greater degree, governments
affected sought to achieve a collectivized international response, including
integrating international administrative process and the evolving the role of
the UNHCR. The results varied from success to failure. But, as to each
such attempt, it is evident that it was the extent of the reconciliation of
migrant choice and state interest that determined results. It is accordingly
the principal lesson to instruct future management of the "European Crisis"
and management of future mass migration that migrant choice and state
interest must become, and remain, the principal focus.

48. Harriet Agerholm, EU Says Member States Can Start Deporting Refugees and Migrants Back
to Greece from March, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 13, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/europe-refugees-migrants-greece-march-a7462 921 .html.
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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON ASSISTANCE TO

REFUGEES IN AFRICA

(1981 AND 1984)

The "ICARA" process undertaken to address African migrations in the
1980s is a story of comprehensive failure of migration management,
particularly notable for its fundamental failure to engage state interest and
migrant choice. The international effort achieved some degree of refugee
relief and protection, but only as a matter of international charity, without
significant achievement of mass migration management towards durable
solutions.
Indeed, much of the deficiency of the international response in the African
context of the early 1980s can be attributed to the failure to clearly identify
state interest and program its engagement with migrant choice. The
political context was surely challenging. It was one of diverse civil conflicts
in Angola, Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Burundi, Chad, Uganda, and
Zaire, generating migrant flow to neighboring states. In general, these
conflicts represented not just localized governmental interests, but in
geographies such as Angola and Ethiopia, much more importantly, proxy
relations to Cold War interests as defined by the United States and the
Soviet Union. The gross failure of migration management for the civil
conflicts in Africa was a result of failure to engage the relevant political and
migrant interests. Instead of capitalizing on the state interests that could
serve to enhance migrant protection within an enterprise of broader political
adjustment, as was done for the Central American and Indochinese mass
migrations, this earlier international effort focused largely around a charity
"burden sharing" model, which never came to significant fruition but
degenerated into strategies of Cold War politics.
The charity model was adopted early on as the focus for management of
the migrations generated by the conflicts in Africa. In the first of two oneoff donor conferences held in Geneva (ICARA I was held in 1981 and
ICARA II in 1984), the following objectives were declared: (1) to focus relief
efforts on "the plight of refugees in Africa;" (2) to "mobilize assistance for
refugees in Africa;" and (3) to help asylum countries endure the burden
induced by the influx of refugees.49 Though the emphasis shifted from
short-term relief to development, altruism and its manifestation as charity
remained the predominant mechanism intended to manage the African
migrations. The compensation being called for was immediate relief and
care for the suffering migrants, host governments, and governments of
origin and development aid that would assist the migrants in their
integration into host countries or their repatriation.
These objectives represented certain distinct coalitions of state interest
but without much (if any) heed to refugee choice. The African
governments' motive for calling for the conference was to seek
compensation for the "burden" imposed on the host communities, often at
the expense of the native communities, generating domestic political blow49. G.A. Res. 35/42, at 182 (Nov. 25, 1980).
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back for these governments. The potential donor governments, being called
upon to mobilize resources and aid, were interested in resolution and being
relieved of the cost of African migrant aid, such as by way of the durable
solutions of integration in host countries and repatriation.50
These were interests that might have been engaged for effective migration
management, but the gaps between them were never bridged.5' A focus on
migrant choice and state interest would have required a conditionality to
overcome the disjunction of the state interests involved and to achieve their
maximal resolution. Instead, the attempt to organize an international
response was founded on the dubious premise that financial assistance to the
governments generating the migrations and to the governments hosting
migrants would naturally lead to durable solutions. It was a premise
unconvincing to the potential donor governments who saw the process as
generating "an open-ended claim on their resources."52 The potential
recipient governments, seeing this donor perception play out, were
discouraged from thinking that aid for national development would ever be
forthcoming in substantial measure. Consequently, support for effective
migration management from any element of the state interests involved
naturally eroded over the course of the ICARA process.
Migration management was not engineered as a key component of a
diplomatic regional process. There was no conditionality between aid and
durable solutions cognizant of migrant choice as for the Central American
conflicts or the Indochinese migrations following the Vietnam war.53
Migration management was not only not made part of political adjustment;
migration was made to serve the conflict. Such migrant aid as was provided
in the African context, for the most part, was earmarked along strictly Cold
War strategic lines.54 Funding was directed not to migrant choice and
empowerment but to strategic objectives that ignored migrant choice; the
interests of states of origin and host states insofar as these interests did not
50. "To the African countries of asylum, ICARA II was to be a burden-sharing conference to
provide assistance to strengthen their social and economic infrastructure. To the donors,
however, the conference provided a chance to achieve durable solutions to prevent future
refugee problems and lead to the voluntary repatriation or permanent integration of refugees.
Such durable solutions would ease the burden of funding care and maintenance on the
international community."
ALEXANDER
BETTS,
PROTECTION
BY
PERSUASION:
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE REFUGEE REGIME 72 (2009) (quoting REFUGEES: A
THIRD WORLD DILEMMA 49 John R. Rogge ed. 1987); see also Barry Stein, DurableSolutions for
Developing Country Refugees, 20 THE INT'L MIGRATION REv. (No. 2 Special Issue) 264, 273-74
(1986) (explaining the solutions discussed in ICARA II).
51. BETTS, supra note 50, at 53-77.
52. Barry Stein, Regional Efforts to Address Refugee Problems (Mar. 21, 1997), https://msu.edu/
course/pls/461/stein/isa-regional.htm.
53. See infra Sections III.B and III.D.
54. It has been estimated that of the $560 million dollars offered by donor states in ICARA I,
the first pledging conference, only $144 million was not earmarked for politically favored
governments, and that very little remainder went to the most heavily impacted host states such
as Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa. BETTS, supranote 50, at 57 (citing GIL
LOESCHER, THE UNHCR AND WORLD POLITICS 227 (2001)).
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serve Cold War interests. Sovereign interest and migrant choice were
engaged not with the priority to relieve the migrant crisis but as a lever of
conflict. The United States in particular was eager to provide help insofar as
the support aligned with its strategic interests, which it perceived as
supporting anticommunist movements. Thus, substantial U.S. funding went
to support Angolan refugees on the FNLA-UNITA side of the struggle
against the MPLA and its Soviet sphere supporters, but not to Ethiopia
(despite Ethiopia experiencing a serious refugee situation) because of
Ethiopia's affiliation with Cuba and the USSR.
Perceiving migration management from a Cold War perspective, the
potential donor Northern states were never convinced development
assistance would result in durable solutions such as local integration. Most
African states argued for repatriation and did not want to commit further
infrastructure and services to migrants that could instead benefit their own
populations.55 These governments were not convinced that local integration
would contribute to national development, and there was no conditionality
of aid to persuade them to take the risk.
At the level of implementation of mass migration management, there was
a profound failure to link state interests and migrant choice in a way that
would overcome the skepticism and inertia. There were common interests
of potential Northern donors and the Southern states and the migrants that
could have been engaged through the provision of development and
integration assistance. There was opportunity to relieve the costs, both
human and financial, of long term protection.56 But, these interests were
never effectively linked through conditionality. Developmental aid and
durable solutions could have been made mutually conditional to serve much
of the refugee population but were not. Substantial aid for refugees was
provided, not as conditional on durable solutions, but primarily as collateral
to furthering transcendent foreign policy interests, such as the United
States' policy of supporting exiled guerrilla movements. The moral
arguments pressed by the African states and potential Northern donor states,
which were persistently asserted by the UNHCR, OAU, and African
governments more generally throughout the ICARA process, had little
impact.57 Migration management conceived as altruism alone, instead of
reconciliation of state interest and migrant choice, culminated naturally in
cynicism and defeat.

55. As the UNHCR officially reported the general perception, "the African countries tried to
win funds for development projects under the guise of refugee emergency relief. They were
more interested in being compensated for the burden of hosting refugees than they were in
using these funds to promote local integration." Id.
56. BETrs, supra note 50, at 72.

57. Id. at 75.
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THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
REFUGEES (1987-1995) (CIREFCA)

ON

CENTRAL

AMERICAN

The conflicts in Central America of the late 1980s and the resolution of
the resulting mass migration into the 1990s (the process known as
CIREFCA), was notably distinguished from the ICARA process in Africa. It
was distinguished by its focus on, and reconciliation of, state interest and
migrant choice through a broad-based conditionality. The Central
American effort of managing migrant flow was made part of the wider
regional peace process and post-conflict regional development wherein these
two principal dynamics for success were thereby well-realized.58
From the outset, migration management for Central America was
characterized not as charity isolated from conflict resolution, but by the
effort to define respective state interests and migrant options. In contrast to
the ICARA approach for Africa of separate pledging conferences devoted to
refugee protection, for CIREFCA the approach was to defer any formal
fundraising until achieving conjunction of migrant choice in the form of
options for protection, return, and resettlement, conjoined with the
development priorities of the host countries and countries of origin. The
process thereby gave all parties a significant stake in the goal of protection,
as integrated with achieving the durable solutions of local integration,
repatriation, and resettlement.
The conflicts in Central America resulted in the displacement of about
2,000,000 persons by the end of the 1980s, 150,000 of which were
recognized as refugees by the UNHCR.59 The international and collective
response of the CIREFCA conferences on Central American refugees
occurred from 1987 to 1995. The conferences were designed to help
achieve peace and development among the countries in the region and
interested outside powers, to integrate the needs of refugees, returnees, and
the internally displaced, while also benefiting local communities.60 A mix of
national interests was skillfully exploited by the diplomats directing the
process to achieve these objectives.
58. The Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation of 1986 was a declaration of intent to
promote democratization and to end armed conflict in Central America. The Esquipulas II
Peace Accords subsequently embodied a more fully agreed peace initiative that stated an
economic framework with measures to promote democratization and other programs to aid
refugees. See id. at 80.
59. CIREFCA, Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favour of Central American Refugees,
Returnees and Displaced Persons, CIREFCA 89/13/Rev.1 (May 30, 1989).
60. CIREFCA drew its legal legitimacy largely from Article 8 of Esquipulas II and its
reference to displacement, and the CIREFCA Concerted Plan of Action being incorporated as a
chapter on displacement in the broader post-conflict reconstruction initiative, the PEC, which
focused on regional economic development. BETTS, supra note 50, at 80; see also UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Returnee Aid and Development, EVAL/RAD/15 (1994), http://www
.unhcr.org/en-us/research/evalreports/3bd4Ofb24/returnee-aid-and-development.html
(concerning the integration objective).
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This was done, first and foremost, by encouraging each state to define its
own economic and development needs within a "Concerted Plan of Action"
that provided a set of principles for migration management put forward by
the UNHCR as conditions for states to receive funds through CIREFCA.
Conditionality was established linkage by linkage as the governments
involved joined in, culminating in a broadly inclusive conditionality for
regional peace. 61 CIREFCA thereby bore the fruit of projects and programs
for refugee management that were for the most part fully funded and
successful.62
Essential within CIREFCA was a determined and consistent effort to
maximize migrant choice in relation to the durable solutions of relocation or
return. From the outset of the process, the commitments to conflict
resolution and refugee management were treated as inextricably bound and
mutually enhancing. Indeed, the CIREFCA process was seen by the
UNHCR as "an instrument of political change" in that it afforded a basis for
interstate consensus building around mass migration at the center of
achieving security.63
CIREFCA found legal foundation in the commitment of Article 8 of the
Esquipulas II peace agreement, which defined a number of measures
intended to promote national reconciliation, an end to hostilities,
democratization, free elections, the termination of all assistance to irregular
forces, negotiations on arms controls, and assistance to refugees.64
Moreover, as to its legitimization, CIREFCA was subsequently incorporated
61. See CIREFCA, Concerted Plan of Action: One Year of Progress and Prospectsfor the Future,
UNCHR Archives
June 27-28, 1990); see also BETTS, supra note 50, at 82-83. In
complementary relationship to this approach, administratively, CIREFCA was set within a
conjunction of institutions with broader objectives of achieving conflict resolution, including
the Esquipulas Peace process for Central America and the Special Programme of Economic
Cooperation for Central America that resulted from the Contadora Act for Peace and
Cooperation in 1986 and the Arias Peace Plan. Id. at 79-80. The significance of CIREFCA in
achieving this evolution and as a model for the future was well noted by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, who declared, "CIREFCA has been a key formative experience in
many respects, breaking new ground in . . . demonstrating the important linkages between
solutions, the consolidation of peace and development." Id. at 91 (quoting Sadako Ogata,
Introductory Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, UNHCR Fonds 11, Series 3, 391.86.5 Jan. 28,
1994)).
62. This evaluation was confirmed by the UNHCR in its report on CIREFCA, declaring,
"The success of the CIREFCA process has its foundation in development ...
a bridge thus
needs to be built whereby the uprooted populations addressed in the CIREFCA initiatives are
gradually incorporated into national development efforts." BETTS, supra note 50, at 96-97
(quoting ProgressReport on the Implementation of the CIREFCA Plan ofAction, UNHCR Fonds 11,
Series 3, 391.86.5 June 1, 1990)).
63. Alexander Betts, Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese
CPA 14 (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 120, 2006) (quoting
Memorandum, UNHCR, CIREFCA Process External Evaluation, UNHCR Fonds 11, Series
3, 391.86.5 (Sept. 21, 1994)).
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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as the chapter on displacement in the plan for post-conflict reconstruction.65
State interest for impacted states such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Mexico was engaged through conditionality by the promise of
development aid that would also empower migrant choice of relocation or
return. The resulting projects were varied in nature, but all were set within
this same conditionality between aid and durable solutions. Thus, for
example, development projects for Guatemala included health, education,
and sanitation projects that would facilitate return and reintegration. For
Nicaragua, development projects focused on rehabilitation and reintegration
for returnees from Honduras. In Honduras, assistance was directed to
migrant camps, pending returns to Guatemala and Nicaragua. In Costa
Rica, projects were designed to achieve integration in local labor markets,
along with educational and sanitation development. In Mexico, projects
were devoted both to integration and repatriation.66

Through the wide range of projects and their conditionality, refugees
were engaged as agents of development and, also, security. Nicaraguan
refugees had been seen as agents of the Contras, and Salvadoran and
Guatemalan refugees as guerillas of the political left. Engaging them,
instead, as agents of development and security therefore contributed to the
national reconciliations required to achieve peace. 67 The conditionality of
aid and migrant management also reinforced stakeholder interests in
reintegration and resettlement, especially by way of improved development
for the local populations impacted by the migrations.68
Though aid through CIREFCA was made conditional on migration
management, it was especially designed to maximize state interest by
maximizing each government's "ownership" of the projects for its territory,
both in terms of control of the projects and responsibility for their
implementation and fruition. The preparatory work for the projects in each
country was based on proposals made by the targeted governments
65. BETTS, supra note 50, at 81-82.
66. See generally id., Betts, supra note 50, at 84-89.
67. "Massive flows of refugees might not only affect the domestic order and stability of
receiving states, but may also jeopardize the political and social stability and economic
development of entire regions, and thus endanger international peace and security. The
solution to the problems of displacement is therefore a necessary part of the peace process in
the region and it is not conceivable to achieve peace while ignoring the problems of refugees
and other displaced persons." BETTS, supra note 50, at 105 (citing CIREFCA Juridical
Committee, Principles and Criteriafor the Protection and Assistance of Refugees, Repatriation and
Displaced Persons, UNHCR Fonds 11, Series #, 391.86.3 HCR/Mex/0890 (1991)); see generally
id. at 100-03, 105-06.
68. As noted for the Preparatory Meeting for CIREFCA, Guatemala, "All project proposals,
whether aimed at refugees, returnees or displaced persons, include a component geared at
redressing the adverse effects felt by the surrounding local population and . . . to improve their
situation." This integrated approach is a substantial part of the strategy of progressively
incorporating refugees or reintegrating returnees in the countries and constitutes a key of the
Plan of Action and of achieving the objectives of CIREFCA in Guatemala. BETTS, supra note
50, at 107 (citing CIREFCA, Report on the PreparatoryMeetingfor CIREFCA, UNHCR Fonds 11
Series 3, 391.86.3 (Apr. 12-14 1989)).
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themselves. This ensured the expression and recognition of state interest to
propel success for migration management. Furthermore, the critical matter
of implementation was on terms developed by each government to maximize
their interests, and hence, their cooperation.
The interests of the donor states-principally the states of the European
Union-were understood, appreciated, and engaged. Certainly, the
projection of European values, including altruism, was involved. But in
terms of state interest, the pre-eminent consideration motivating European
funding was that 20 percent of the regional trade affected by the Central
American conflicts was at stake in the commercial relationships between the
Central American states and the EU. The EU governments were
accordingly drawn into the process by the promise of the conditionality of
development and migrant management that would sustain and enlarge trade
and investment with Central America through providing security and
stability. The potential states of return and resettlement shared, of course,
these same state interests in trade and investment benefits for the region.
Indeed, for all parties the conditionality clarified that migrant management,
as it affected security and stability, was an essential component of a regional
peace process and the promise of economic benefit.
Especially illustrative of the critical importance of engagement of national
interest in the management of mass migration was the fact that the United
States, in the early stages of the CIREFCA process, was not supportive of
management through prioritization of migrant choice. U.S. foreign policy
was to support the migrant populations in narrowly defined strategic and
security terms (as in Africa), distinguishing, for example, between antiSandinista and Contra-aligned groups with respect to the conflict in
Nicaragua. But later, with the ending of the global Cold War and the
change of government in Nicaragua in 1990, the United States became a
principal donor through engagement of its strategic interest in supporting
the peace deal and the newly elected government in Nicaragua.69
As proven so dramatically in the European Refugee Crisis, migrant
receiving countries ultimately determine their own immigration policies as
expression of sovereignty. Though open to guidance, to lesser and greater
degree, from regional organizations such as the EU or globally from the
UNHCR, they strive in large measure to respond to their own national,
political, and strategic considerations. This was certainly true of CIREFCA.
The principal strategy was to develop political support by engaging the
specific interests of the governments involved and to defer any financial
emphasis, such as pledging, until that support was adequately secured.70
That this prioritization of state interest over charity worked is best
illustrated by the turn in U.S. strategic policy which resulted in
$422,300,000 in resources being made available to protect and care for the
69. BETTs, supra note 50, at 102-04.
70. Id. at 82-84.
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displaced, affording them choice in resettlement or return as one dynamic
for achieving durable peace in Central America.7'
As the result of its creative conditional linkage of state interest and
migrant choice, CIREFCA has been widely judged a model for the
cooperation of states in achieving durable solutions for the displaced. It has
been universally acclaimed as such not only by the UNHCR, but by a
United Nations General Assembly Resolution demonstrating the broad
political consensus eventually achieved for its success.72
C.

THE REFUGEE EMERGENCY GENERATED BY THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA IN THE

WARS

IN THE

1990s

The migrations generated by the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the
1990s are especially notable as a failure of international migration
management; despite numerous initiatives throughout the conflict and
continuing meetings at various levels of international organization, nothing
of significance was accomplished. This was because migration management
was never effectively engaged with state interest and migrant choice.
Where refugees migrated was determined essentially by default, by the
dynamics of war, and by where people fled to avoid the conflict. There was
no collective scheme for large scale resettlement developed, although by
1993, about 600,000 migrants fleeing the conflict had entered the EU.73
The only manifestation of international response on the ground was pushback in the form of action by EU member states separately imposing barriers
to stem the flow, as by way of visa requirements.74 Migrant choice operated
as a primary dynamic; migrants entered where they chose, either before visa
restrictions were imposed, or through irregular non-legal channels during
the conflict, resulting in a grossly uneven distribution within the EU.75 But,
migrant choice was never integrated with the prevailing state interests.
There was no such integration even for arrangements of international
charity, as for the African migrations. Nor was there any integration with
regional peace efforts as for Central America.
The explanation cannot simply be the seemingly intractable nature of the
conflict until force was applied through NATO and peace achieved. Mass
migration is naturally the product of seemingly intractable conflict,
intractable until peace is achieved. It is conflict, of course, that is a principle
driver, if not the principle driver, of mass migration.76 That is true of all the
71. Id. at 87 (citing CIREFCA Process: External Evaluation, memo, 21 Sept. 1994, UNHCR
Fonds 11, Series 3, 391.86.5, UNHCR Archives, (D. Chefeke to all SMC members)).
72. U.N. G.A. expressed, in the International Conference on Central American Refugees, "its
conviction that ... the process could serve as a valuable lesson to be applied to other regions of
the world." G.A. Res. 48/117, at 4 (Sept. 21, 1994).
73. See Astri Suhrke, Burden-sharingDuring Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus

NationalAction, 11 J. oF

REFUGEE STUD.

396, 407 (1998).

74. See id. at 407.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 402.
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historical episodes here recounted, though surely the more intractable the
conflict, the greater the difficulty achieving refugee management.
But, what explains the gross failure in Yugoslavia at any level of the
international institutional and legal resources invoked for management?
The principal explanation is that the efforts to develop a collectivized
response started and ended with a call for more "equitable distribution" of
the refugees.77 The multiple management initiatives were all premised on
achieving 'fairness' amongst the governments targeted for migrant
relocation.78 But all such initiatives were still-born, never achieving any
actual implementation. To the extent migrant protection was provided, it
was at best by way of temporary protection where the migrants appeared.79
Unlike the CIREFCA process instituted for Central America, there was
no threshold effort to identify the state interests at stake that might have
been managed for the benefit of the migrants. The early collective effort of
informal Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum and Immigration held
by the European and North American states and Australia, and meetings
held with the Bosnian, Croatian, Slovenian, and Hungarian officials, resulted
in a proposal for sharing based on fixed quotas.80 The quotas were to be
calibrated to "absorption capacity" keyed to socio-economic factors.,' But,
there was no state interest engaged to support absorption. Indeed, a
principal concern was that a system of quotas would result in minimal offers
of admission.82

At a London 1992 meeting of European immigration ministers, a
principle of coordinated action within "national capabilities" was
promoted.83 But, there was never any refinement of such national
capabilities other than the general call for achieving equity between states in
absorbing the flow.84 State interest was perceived essentially as a matter of

fairness between states. This was not a course to engage the economic and
strategic national interests inherent in the genocidal break-up of the former
Yugoslavia. The principal interests that were at stake in the break-up had
little to do with "fairness." Moreover, a collective call for equitable "burden
sharing" generated the concern that there would be free riding by some
governments that would seek the lowest level of commitment that could be
offered without political embarrassment. 5 In practical effect, therefore, the
most the EU was able to muster, given the reality of the migration flow, was
affirmation of the principle of temporary protection and the vague
77. See id. at 408.
78. See Astri Suhrke, Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus
NationalAction, 11 J. oF REFUGEE STUD. 398, 407 (1998).
79. See id. at 407.
80. See id.
8 1. See id.
82. Id. at 407; see discussion infra Section IV.A.1 (maintaining this is an endemic risk inherent
in any fixed quota scheme dependent on adoption by sovereign states).
83. See Suhrka, supra note 78, at 407.
84. See id. at 407-09.
85. See id. at 408.
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prescription that EU members should admit in accordance with national
capabilities.86
By the mid-1990s, states impacted by the flow, led by Sweden and Austria,
pressed for a plan for equitable distribution,87 but this similarly did not
engage the strategic interests at stake. For example, both France and UK
had troops on the ground in the former Yugoslavia and argued that their
troop contributions should be counted against refugee admissions.- This
proposal, that might have been an entr6e for integration with the broader
peacekeeping interests, was not pursued. "Sharing" and "equity" remained
the keywords for the European initiatives for migration management
throughout the 1990s.89 The UK and France, not perceiving their broader
strategic interests in resolving the conflict to be served by the limited focus
on achieving "equity" among states, and whose cooperation would be critical
to a unified European response, effectively vetoed the limited process such as
it was. 90 The failure to engage state interest more inclusively resulted in low
intake countries such as the UK and France refusing to support a scheme
capable of implementation to help the other governments most directly
impacted by the flow.91 The European Union efforts culminated in a 1995
resolution92 that did not provide any formula for distribution. It was
hortatory, calling for solidarity, equity, and harmonization of response, with
nothing concrete being achieved to alter the unequal distribution
determined by the migrants themselves.93 The resolution in its final drafting
eventually included the principle advanced by the UK and France that
peace-keeping participation could be counted against refugee admission.94
But no such scheme was ever adopted, and the injection of a broader
recognition of state interest tied to peacekeeping never became joined with a
migration management program going forward.95
The project to develop a collective response, which started in 1992 in
informal intergovernmental meetings, included through the 1990s a host of
meetings involving the UNHCR, the EU Parliament, the EU Commission,
European immigration ministers, the Conference on Security and Co86. See id.
87. Id. at 408-10.
88. See id. at 408-409.
89. Thus, for example, the European Parliament resolved in January 1994, that the European
Commission should "draw up ...
an emergency plan for the reception of refugees which
provides for them to be distributed evenly among the countries of the Community." Resolution
on the General Principles of a European Refugee Policy, 1994 O.J. (C 44) 109.
90. Suhrke, supra note 78, at 408-09.
91. See id. at 409.
92. See Council Resolution on Burden-Sharing with Regard to the Admission and Residence
of Displaced Persons on a Temporary Basis, 1995 O.J. (C 262) 1 [hereinafter Council
Resolution of 1995].
93. See id.; see also Suhrke, supra note 78, at 410.
94. See id.
95. See Suhrka, supra note 78, at 410.
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operation in Europe, and the Council of Europe.96 These efforts culminated
in an EU Commission Resolution in 1997 that declared the option of
adopting a collective decision-making framework to be "a common
approach" for meeting future mass influx.97 It was proposed to include some
element of state interest in minimizing mal-distribution by assisting those
states receiving a disproportionate number of migrants. The "common
approach" proposed included harmonization of rights as a distributive device
to encourage more even distribution of migrant flow, and in that regard,
called for greater recognition of migrant choice.98 But, there was no
commitment other than to look forward to harmonization of rights, and to
consider assistance for governments receiving a disproportionate number of
refugees.99 Whether to apply any collective procedure for future migrant
management was left open for future determination on an ad hoc basis.100
Moreover, and more importantly, there was no indication of treatment of
migrant management within a broader process of conditional assistance to
achieve peace. The mantra remained "equity" of distribution despite the
repeated failures to achieve that objective. Any initiative for migration
management was thereby effectively diverted from the fundamental need to
achieve reconciliation of migrant choice and the sovereign interest within a
broader peace process.
D.

THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION FOR INDOCHINESE

REFUGEES (1988-1996) (THE CPA)

The mass migration of Indochinese Refugees in the period 1988-1996
presented a conundrum of migrant choice and state interest equal to any. Its
management was accordingly marked by both failures and successes, advance
and retreat. But in the end, the determined effort to achieve a collective
resolution did result in remarkable success. That success is exemplary of a
determined and persistent course of maximizing state interest and migrant
choice.
The aftermath of the Vietnam War presented the international
community with a surge of migrants, human rights abuse, and lives at risk.
The migrants launched themselves into rough seas on small boats, at risk not
only of drowning, but also abuse by pirates, and increasingly, actual physical
push-back from the states in the region. Even the states accommodating
first arrivals soon refused to allow the "Indochinese boat people" access to
land in their territory, a response not dissimilar to the current closing of the
"Balkan route" and border enhancement such as Frontex for Europe.
As media images recorded deaths at sea, and the broader tragedy became
apparent and undeniable, a collective response was generated. In July 1979,
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 407-11.
See id. at 411.
See id. at 412; see also Council Resolution of 1995, supra note 92, at para. 4.
See id.
Suhrke, supra note 78, at 406-12.
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the United Nations convened an international conference to meet the
challenge of over one million people fleeing Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos.101 The sixty-five governments attending agreed to commitments
aiming for durable solutions.102 It was agreed that countries in the region as
well as outside the region would offer resettlement places while countries of
origin would discourage unauthorized departures and cooperate in an
Orderly Departure Program (the ODP).103 This program and its evolution
ultimately served to provide resettlement for nearly two million Indochinese
refugees.104

By the 1980s, the ODP broke down under unceasing flow, resulting in
resettlement constriction and countries of first asylum reverting to pushback, leaving about 150,000 migrants in detention centers without durable
solution.105 In May 1989, Malaysia began turning back boatloads of
Vietnamese refugees,106 and in 1986, Vietnam stopped interviewing
applicants for U.S. departures, generating a surge of new illegal departures,
resulting in Thailand sending back boats, and Indonesia and Hong Kong
denying resettlement. 107
Considering the declining prospects for management of the flow, a second
conference was convened by the UNHCR in 1989.108 At this conference, a

multiplicity of governments negotiated what was ultimately to provide
successful resolution, the program known as the Comprehensive Plan of
Action (CPA) for Indochinese Refugees.109 The CPA was a three-sided
agreement between the country of origin (primarily Vietnam), the first
countries of asylum in the region (the ASEAN states and Hong Kong), and
third countries of resettlement (led by the United States).110 Vietnam agreed
to reintegrate boat people not found to be refugees, and the "first countries
of asylum" agreed to admit all asylum seekers situated in their territory and
to host a screening process to determine which of the migrants qualified as
101. See BETTS, supra note 58, at 112-13 (stating the agreement reached by the UNHCR in
1979 held long enough to resettle over one million Indochinese refugees); Peter H. Schuck,
Refugee Burden-Sharing:A Modest Proposal, YALE LAw SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES,
255 (Paper 1694, 1997) at 256-57 (stating over 1.7 million Indochinese refugees were resettled
between 1979 and 1989).
102. See Schuck, supra note 101, at 255.
103. See id.
104. See BETTS, supra note 50, at 112-13 (stating the agreement reached by the UNHCR in
1979 held long enough to resettle over one million Indochinese refugees); Schuck, supra note
101, at 256-57 (stating over 1.7 million Indochinese refugees were resettled between 1979 and
1989).
105. See East Asia and the Pacific, World Refugee Survey: 1991 in Review (1992), at 56, 61;
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, U.S. Deputy Sec'y of State, Indochina Refugee Situation: Toward a
Comprehensive Plan of Action, Address at the International Conference on Indochinese
Refugees (June 13, 1989), in DEP'T ST. BULL., June 1989; see also BETTS, supra note 50, at 114.
106. See Schuck, supra note 101, at 257.
107. See id. at 257-58.
108. See id. at 258.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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"refugees.""' It would be a region-wide refugee status determination
process, but in accordance with national legislation, and UNHCR training
and oversight in internationally accepted practice.112
The screening process, as it played out, was plagued with human rights
abuse. Arrivals were subject to refugee screening by local officials, and those
screened out remained in holding centers for repatriation.113 There were
protests, until, in 1996, Vietnam and the United States agreed to U.S.
interviews before repatriation, and upon return to Vietnam, that those
repatriated would be allowed to apply for U.S. resettlement."1
Implementation continued to run up against rights abuses and widespread
critique for these abuses. The reality for many of the "boat people" was a
form of forced, albeit mitigated, return to Vietnam-arguably
refoulement.115 But, the agreement ultimately worked to clear the refugee
camps and detention centers. As a detailed study has demonstrated, what
ultimately made it work was that the CPA, while designed to achieve
humanitarian objectives, adopted as the means to the ends of durable
solutions, a creative conditionality of a wide range of state interests matched
to the choices the migrants were making on the grounds that were aligned to
this result.116
The state interest motivations were high and low, and much in-between.
On the low side, it included Indonesia stimulating trade linked to the flow of
remittances and corruption within the refugee status determination process.
The CPA was also made attractive for regimes that needed to show
improvement in their dismal human rights records, such as the Suharto
regime in Cambodia and the Marcos regime in the Philippines."1 Vietnam,
by supporting return and cooperating to reduce clandestine departures,
sought to maximize support from the other nations for development
assistance to promote the resource requirements of refugee return and
integration, trade, and Vietnam's global reengagement. Given decline of
support from the Soviet Union and its increasingly problematic relationship
111. See id. at 259.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 258-59.
114. See id. at 259 (explaining that in early 1996 the U.S. and Vietnam agreed to a U.S.
interview for the migrants before leaving camps and that they would go to their areas of origin
while awaiting the interviews).
115. See id. at 264.
116. In creating and implementing the CPA, the risk of "free riding" was minimized by
capitalizing on the specific interests of each state involved, and making realization of its interests
conditional. It was key to the program that all states involved understood their conditional
contribution was necessary to serve both their separate and collective interests. The mutually
conditional character was recognized as fundamental in the UN General Assembly Resolution
on the CPA, which stated that "the measures stipulated in the Comprehensive Plan of Action
are interrelated and mutually reinforcing and should be implemented in their totality by all
States concerned." G.A. Res. 44/138, (Dec. 15, 1989). See BETTs, supra note 50, at 125-138
(full discussion of the state interests and trade-offs involved in the agreement).
117. BETs, supra note 50, at 120-123.
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with China, Vietnam was seeking to foster new sources of trade and
resources of development assistance from Europe and eventually the United
States.
As U.S. relations with Vietnam improved, both the United States and
Vietnam modified their positions on return, cooperation, and assistance.
Concurrently, the United States also used the "boat people" issue to
improve relations with the ASEAN nations in trade, oil resources, and
strategic deployment of U.S. forces by way of military base enhancement in
the Philippines and Thailand.iis The United States, by taking the lead on
resettlement, was thereby serving its interest in regional security and the
containment of communism in Southeast Asia. For U.S., domestic politics,
this also suited the anti-communist agenda and garnered strong support
from the Vietnamese diaspora in the United States.
For the states in the AEAN region, the CPA afforded the means to achieve
migration control, especially in relation to the political sensitivity of
dangerous demographics, such as for Malaysia and Indonesia, where the
proportion of ethnic Chinese was a concern for assuring social stability.
Thailand, sharing a border with Cambodia, saw the CPA as relieving the
destabilizing risk of Vietcong infiltrators among the migrants. Hong Kong
saw the CPA as a means to mitigate the threat of higher density of migrants.
For all the ASEAN states, there was also the interest in demonstrating the
strength of regional alliance.119
The CPA, in accommodating not only the realities of state interest, but
also migrant choice, managed motivations well beyond the definition of
refugee. Indeed, the apparent unending waves of migrants included many
migrants coming from North Vietnam seeking, primarily, economic
opportunity. The CPA adopted in 1989 accordingly incorporated return as
a principle solution, but along with a process for individual status
determination, included further accommodation for those who refused to go
back, by their inclusion for resettlement.120 In recognition of the importance
of migrant choice and cooperation, the UNHCR engaged in matching,
insofar as practicable, the resettlement criteria of states with the preferences
of the migrants. All this went beyond the legal criteria of international
refugee law, including resettlement of both those fleeing North Vietnam for
economic opportunity, and those fleeing South Vietnam in classic flight
from persecution fitting the Convention definition of refugee.121
Thus, while conforming to International Refugee Law, the CPA was
above all, a pragmatic process which elevated the maximization of migrant
choice in relation to state interest. This was especially illustrated when there
developed a crisis in the program in the mid-1990s over Vietnam's
reluctance to allow returns at a sufficient rate for reduction of clandestine
departures. It reached a critical stage when the countries of asylum issued a
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id., at 133-37.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 131
Id. at 125.
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joint statement threatening to abandon the fundamental principle of nonrefoulement.122 Ironically, the United States and Vietnam initially took a
similar position of opposing involuntary repatriation, though for different
reasons, in opposition to the countries of asylum.123 The formula finally
achieved to resolve the crisis was not to call repatriation "forced" or
"voluntary" while reaffirming the principle that those who were found to be
refugees could not be sent back.
Operationally, a key aspect was the enhancement of migrant choice as the
means to satisfy humanitarian and human rights objectives-non-refugees
would be actively encouraged to return after three months of counseling.
They would not be coerced, and respect for their rights would be monitored
by the UNHCR upon their return to Vietnam. The U.S. government
established large admission quotas reflecting its anti-communist agenda and
legacy, urging other states to contribute financially and pressuring others to
provide protection, keeping the affected states engaged and pressed to do
more. But, the scheme left each government, in deference to their
respective national interests, to define their share per their own intake
criteria and procedures.
Though there were shortcomings in implementation, particularly as to
prolonged detentions in Hong Kong, by 1991 the rate of returns
significantly increased and the rate of new arrivals declined. This was
answered by increased aid for Vietnam for development and trade until the
CPA process ended in 1996, by which time all the boat people either
resettled as refugees or reintegrated into Vietnam.124
The CPA success was no doubt attributable to the conditionality of state
interest engaged, along with the prioritization of migrant choice. The
ASEAN states and Hong Kong provided asylum on condition that the U.S.
and other states provided asylum, resettlement, and respected nonrefoulement, and that Vietnam would cooperate for return in a protected
status for those deemed to be non-refugees. But, beyond the formal
conditionality of this deal between the governments, the entire process was
de facto designed for conditionality on cooperation by the migrants
themselves seeing advantage in the scheme. In sum, the principal durable
solutions-asylum, resettlement, return, and integration-were all made
conditional on a maximal reconciliation of state interest and migrant choice.

122. They declared, "in the event of failure to agree even on an intermediate solution to the
VBP (Vietnamese boat people) problem, countries of temporary refuge must reserve the right
to take such unilateral action as they deem necessary to safeguard their national interest,
including the abandonment of temporary refuge." joint Statement by Countries of Temporary
Refuge, May 16, 1990, Manila, UNHCR Fonds 11, Series 3, 391.89, UNHCR Archives.
123. BETTS, supra note 50, at 141.
124. See BETTS, supra note 50, at 119-20, 141-42.
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IV. Guidance for the Future; Maximum Reconciliation of
Migrant Choice and State Interest

A.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MASS MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

In these major episodes of mass migration since adoption of the Refugee
Convention, we see that positive international intervention has depended on
the degree to which migrant choice and state interest were reconciled. Mass
migration management accordingly depends upon a largely voluntary
dynamic-however much international efforts purport to dictate solutions.
It is, therefore, to be expected that attempts to engineer a mandatory
comprehensive system, even such as by way of the legally binding Directives
and Regulations of the EU,125 are inclined to fail. State control of
immigration no doubt is imperative for any design to work, given that
national governments will not concede immigration control. And to the
degree there is dependence on coercion of migrants to implement a
mandatory system, it leads to dead ends instead of truly durable solutions.
Thus, we have the tragic reality that most characterizes migrant
management today-the confinement of hundreds of thousands of migrants
in "temporary" camps in conditions of hopelessness.
It is also a lesson of international attempts to regulate mass migration that,
to the extent any regulatory framework denies choice to migrants, migrants
will avoid it and seek "irregular" non-legal means.1 26 This in turn results in
the growth of smuggler networks.127 Thus, interdiction strategies in
themselves, whether visa requirements, carrier sanctions, summary removal
at borders, purported "safe country relocation" as currently designated for
Turkey, or "readmission agreements" leading to chain refoulement, simply
spur irregular movement.
These lessons should have provided guidance for management of the
"European Refugee Crisis." Instead, large portions of the flow have been
incentivized to work around the controls, many of the migrants having
simply "disappeared," choosing to go elsewhere than governments and laws
would send them, often forming new aggregations of unidentified urban
poor in the countries of their chosen destination.128
This is not only true of the recent European experience, but has been the
course in other contexts where government has purported to manage mass
migration without accounting for migrant choice. The immigration
125. Although both EU Regulations and EU Directives are binding on member states,
regulations are self-executing. EU Directives, by contrast, set goals that all EU member states
must achieve. However, in this case, implementation is done through domestic "implementing
legislation" in each member state. See Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, EUROPA, https://
europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-actsen (last visited Nov. 10, 2017).
126. See e.g., Nektaria Stamouli, Migrants in Greece Drop Off Grid, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2016,
10:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/migrants-in-greece-drop-off-grid-1481106606.
127. See id.
128. See Stamouli, supra note 126 (noting the disappearance of 13,000 refugees of 63,000
migrants who were awaiting processing in Greece).
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controversy in the United States that so influenced recent elections, and a
presidential campaign strategy of demonizing "illegal" immigrants, has not
dramatically modified migrant choice.129 Even where mass influx has been
shaped by the special imposition of legal constraints, much or most of the
population flow works around the limitations. This, for example, was the
situation of the Salvadoran flow into the United States in the 1980s.130
Though the migrants avoided deportation through Temporary Protection
Status (TPS) granted on the assumption they would return to El Salvador
when the security situation improved, few of the almost 200,000 original
TPS Salvadorans have had to leave.131 Some have achieved permanent legal
status, but more have found anonymity in the general population, essentially
lost to any accounting by the U.S. legal system.1 32
As demonstrated in Europe, the Americas, and Asia, large portions of any
mass influx population will integrate on their own in lieu of legal
alternatives. States affording economic advantage and security, not just
front-line states or "hot spots," will bear the brunt of the flow. The
estimated 12,000,000 "illegals" in the United Sates, and the multitude of
"disappeared" migrants who have become the new normal of urban poor
populations throughout Europe, are evidence enough. Enhanced border
controls, without much more, simply abandon management of the flow to
greater risk-taking by the more desperate migrants, and grow the criminal
networks of human trafficking.
Going forward considering the historical experience, the instruction,
therefore, is that any potential "durable solution," or any other strategy that
may help in the management of mass migration, requires assessment of the
state interests implicated, and collating these interests with migrant choice.
For the member states of the EU, the costs of resettlement are naturally to
be weighed against the costs of securing borders for strategy of return, or
integration in place, or temporary protection, today manifested most
prominently in Turkey and Lebanon. But the relative costs-economic,
social, and humanitarian-will be assessed, in some form, by each
government involved, and by the migrants themselves, as the condition for
engagement in, and cooperation with, any collective strategy.
Though management depends on sovereign consent and migrant choice,
it must be secured within a typically complex reality of diverse and changing
motivations. The challenge is heightened by the constantly evolving nature
129. See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-aboutillegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ (reporting that Pew Research Center estimated that 12.2
million illegal immigrants were living in the U.S. in 2007, although the estimate for the illegal
immigrant population in the U.S. in 2015 dropped to 11 million).
130. See Aaron Terrazas, Salvadoran Immigrants in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY
INSTITUTE (Jan. 5, 2010), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/salvadoran-immigrantsunited-states.
13 1. See id.
132. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY, 889-96 (3d. ed.
1995).
RESEARCH
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of migrant flow-changing numbers of migrants, their ethnic and cultural
make-up, and today, the perceived risks of international terrorism. The
necessary accounting includes costs and job availability that varies over
time-which indicates the inadequacy of any system that would depend on
fixing allocations on anything other than a temporary basis. Success in
managing mass migration has always depended on ongoing negotiation of
numbers and conditions and adjustment as states' interest and migrant
choice evolve, as exemplified best by the Indochinese and Central American
migrations.
To the extent any management strategy is at odds with the interests of the
separate states involved, it is marked for failure. This is illustrated by recent
EU experience, especially by the recent EU proposal of negative sanction to
be leveled against EU member states that fail to follow EU migration
Directives on burden sharing, imposing a penalty of C250,000 for each
refugee resettlement refused.33 On any realistic evaluation, the proposal is a
non-starter. Governments already disinclined to the bear the perceived
social and economic costs of migrant management will simply refuse on
grounds of sovereign interest to bear such costs.
The historical experience in reference to state interest demonstrates that
the governments of transit and potential resettlement, as well as states of
origin and potential return, respond to positive incentives, namely some
form of payment or other support for migrant protection and refugee
asylum. Payment was made available to facilitate both the Central American
resolution and the CPA for Indochina. To the extent such financial support
can be obtained through a general funding rather than direct imposition of
individual state debit or penalty, it affords the greatest promise of success.
The same governments that will reject any sanction system, will contribute
to general purpose regional funding. Agreed payments from a central fund
need not founder on problems of exactitude and fairness, but can be
determined by negotiation, as they were for the Indochinese CPA and
Central America. Such general funding is also an attractive means for any
state to avoid long term commitments. It thereby helps to mollify domestic
fiscal concern. We already see this in the evolving strategies of the EU,
which has allocated general funding not only to secure borders, but also for
refugee relief, resettlement, and repatriation1 Moreover, states disinclined
to make long term commitments on a national basis can be most easily
drawn into regional arrangements, where preexisting patterns of cooperation
and trade-of can be engaged.
The EU/Turkey/Greece deal, despite all its flaws, legal and practical, was
targeted to capitalize on the interests of the EU member states and Turkey.
Turkey gained immediate substantial geopolitical advantage and financial
support in its relations with Europe-in the promise of payment of about
C6,000,000,000 and the promise of relief from visa restrictions in its relations
133. Dublin IV Proposal, supra note 21, at art. 37.
134. See Asylum Fund Regulation, supra note 12.
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with Europe.35 Indeed, the promise of EU visas for Turkish citizens was
made a condition of the deal, though yet unfulfilled, having become a major
sore point in the troubled saga of Turkey/EU relations.
The EU/Turkey/Greece deal's arrangement for containing migrant flow
is the principal collective effort to date for the management of the flow
towards Europe and the apparent model for broader European response to
the migrations from the Middle East and Africa.136 But, where that deal has
critically failed is in its negation of migrant choice. Its flaws and failings as it
has played out on the ground have been well documented in an abundance of
non-contradicted NGO reports and press accounts. Everyone confirms the
situation on the ground is seriously out of compliance with the requirements
of international refugee law, humanitarian law, and human rights law.137
This should be expected in that the deal affords little if any deference to
migrant choice. Thus far in its evolution, it represents, almost exclusively, a
negotiation of state interest without significant correlation to migrant
choice. And, because it ignores migrant choice, it is barely more than
collateral to the closing of the Balkan route, resulting in irregular migrant
surge elsewhere, such as through the more dangerous route from Africa
across the Mediterranean to Italy. The tragic reality is a small number of
migrants are being relocated through the EU/Turkey/Greece deal, while
irregular arrivals are increasing through ever more dangerous routes.' 38
1.

Quota Schemes

The history of international involvement in migration management
compels the conclusion that there is no single scheme that suits all migration
management, given the variety of evolving state interests and migrant
motivations that characterizes mass migration. But what is certain, is that
135. See European Commission Memoranda MEMO/16/963, supra note 20.
136. North African transit countries have seen it as a basis for similar demands of a quid pro quo
for curbing immigration, such that in September of 2016 German chancellor Angela Merkel, in
recognition of these demands, recommended that a number of African and North African
countries be given agreements similar to the deal with Turkey. Michelle Martin et al., Merkel:
We Need MigrantDeals with African States like EU-Turkey Pact, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2016, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany-idUSKCNI1WIFR (last visited May
19, 2017). See also Makini Brice, Niger Tells Europe it Needs I Billion Euros to Fight Illegal
Migration, REUTERS, May 3, 2016, http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN0XUlJV
(last visited May 19, 2017). Similar arrangements have also been advanced for the Libya-Italy
route, with Libya seeking investment commitment in return for migrant control. See Isla Binne,
Italy, Libya Discuss Investment in Return for Migration Control, REUTERS, May 17, 2016, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-italy-libya-idUSKCN0Y82IS (last visited May 19,
2017).
137. See e.g., Mark Povera, The EU-Turkey Deal: Analysis and Considerations,JESUIT REFUGEE
SERVICE EUROPE Apr. 27, 2016.
138. See Drew Hinshaw et al., Migrant Toll Rises as Quarrels Hinder Rescues, WALL ST. J., Apr.
19, 2017, at All (noting that irregular arrivals of migrants crossing the Mediterranean are up
almost 24 percent from the same period in 2016, with the record of migrant deaths crossing the
Mediterranean similarly on track to be broken). See also Spijkerboer, supra note 32.
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maximizing reconciliation of the state interests and migrant motivations in
each evolving context of mass migration is the prescription for greatest
success. Furthermore, because mass migration typically overwhelms the
resources of any state, solution and resolution is best achieved through
collective response, variable though it may be.
There are many proposals for more "equitable burden sharing" as the
basis for collective international response. Typically, these are proposals for
quota commitments by each potential state for resettlement, to be declared
in reference to a formula designed to achieve fairness in distributing the
migrants for resettlement and for repatriation, if that should become
possible. Typically, the commitments are secured at a "pledging conference."
Typically, the results fall short of the pledges.139 But the concept,
nevertheless, is to provide a viable formula for correlating the durable
solutions of resettlement and repatriation with the respective resources of
the governments involved. A formula is developed to accomplish this, based
on objective measures, such as GNP, a country's population size and
employment rate. The "reference key" of the Dublin IV proposal is the
most prominent current example of this approach.140 But in seeking as a
priority, "fairness between states," quota systems are notable for their
diminishment of consideration of migrant preferences and particularized
state interests, and therein lies their greatest flaw.
Provision for quotas are one response to the principle of non-refoulement
declared as fundamental in Article 33 of the Refugee Convention.141 Mass
migration typically results in undue pressure on frontline states, as it has in
Europe. The rule of non-refoulement precludes return, at least for the time
required for the processing of claims, which even under so-called "expedited
determination" procedures may be a considerable time. This requires, to
relieve the volatile pressures of mass migration, settlement somewhere, at
least on a temporary basis, of those migrants with bona fide claims for
protection. Quota systems are accordingly promoted as providing a safety
valve, which, whether operating within a scheme of temporary protection or
long term, can reinforce the principle of non-refoulement.
139. In September 2016, fresh off the heels of a summit held by the UNHCR, former President
Obama of the United States held a Leader's Summit on Refugees aimed at establishing concrete
commitments to refugee relocation and integration from the leaders of fifty-two countries and
international organizations. The ultimate outcome was that the states and organizations
involved pledged to roughly double the number of refugees they admit over their 2016 levels.
Fact Sheet on the Leader's Summit on Refugees, Sept. 20, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.arch
ives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-refugees (last visited May 19,
2017). However, in 2016, there were about 162,500 refugees submitted for resettlement
through the UNHCR. UNHCR-Resettlement, 2017, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/resettle
ment.html (last visited May 19, 2017). Doubling that number still will not be adequate for
satisfying the projected need of 1.19 million resettlements in 2017. Press Release, UNHCR,
UNHCR report puts projected resettlement needs in 2017 at 1.19 million (June 13, 2016).
140. See Dublin IV Proposal, supra note 21.
141. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
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As promoted in the major episodes of mass migration since the 1951
Convention, a quota system may take a variety of forms, ranging from
leaving states no option but to accept their allocated quota or inclusion of
the option to renegotiate after the initial allocation, as did occur in the
evolving Indochinese CPA and Central American mass migration
managements.1 42 Schemes developed in the academic literature also
prominently include the market analogy of tradeable quotas, analogous to
the "cap and trade" schemes of environmental law, whereby governments
would be able to buy and sell quotas with each other after the initial
allocation, but within a collective status determination process. 43
As quota systems are proposed as means to secure "burden sharing"
among states-migrants are being envisioned as the "burden," and not in any
sense a resource for constructive development. In the EU context, quotas
are proposed to relieve the "burden" on the front-line states where the flow
of migrants may be staunched, particularly Greece, to diminish the flow
particularly to the states targeted by migrants as the most desirable
destinations, such as Germany and France.
In seeking to achieve, above all, "equity" among states, quota systems tend
to employ negative incentives, which cut precisely against particularized
state interest and migrant choice. Thus, for example, in the formulation for
the proposed "Dublin IV," there is the C250,000 monetary penalty for
everyone rejected from an assigned quota.1 44
The characterization of migration as predominantly a negative social
phenomenon, requiring spreading the "burden" migrants may impose,
surely implies commodification of migrants incompatible with the
humanitarian goals of refugee law.145 This characterization ignores the
proven positive social and economic aspects of immigration when
constructively managed. But whether viewed from a moral or practical
perspective, any systemic response based on quotas alone must fail because it
is divorced from consideration of migrant preference. The employment of a
distribution mechanism focused exclusively on fairness between
governments relegates migrant preference to each of the affected
government's immigration policies and laws, which may or may not allow
much discretion for consideration of migrant choice. Quota systems tend to
operate significantly at odds with humanitarian and human rights concerns
because their primary objective is to manage distribution of refugees as the
means to achieve equity between states, in lieu of recognizing separate
sovereign interests or provision for migrant choice that may be critical for
successful management. But, what migrants choose to do cannot be
successfully ignored, because what migrants choose to do is what will
primarily determine where migrants are in fact "allocated."
142. See Schuck, supra note 101.

143. See Schuck, supra note 101.
144. See Dublin IV Proposal, supra note 12, art. 37, at 68-69.
145. See Schuck, supra note 101, at 296.
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Some quota systems include compensation or other forms of support for
hosting states where management resources are deemed insufficient, such as
in the EU/Turkey/Greece deal. But as that deal illustrates, so far as
compensation has been given as a collective means to incentivize states, it
has been largely to secure detention facilities on the other side of the border.
Individuals in mass migration, at risk of basic physical security for
themselves and their families, will eventually overrun any formulaic
allocations such as quotas which wholly ignore their choice of destination.
And, failing to attract cooperation of the migrants themselves means states
will turn to coercion, which in turn compounds the pressures for secondary
movement and enhancement of the pernicious smuggler networks.
This course, unfortunately, has been the general path that continues to be
set for Europe facing continuing mass migration. In recent proposals for
modification of the Dublin system by way of a "Dublin IV," the EU
Commission was quite explicit that the intention was to exclude refugee
choice on resettlement. The Commission asserted the absolutist position
that, "an applicant neither has the right to choose the member state of
application nor the member state responsible for examining the
application."146 Under Dublin IV, failure to comply would result in harsh
sanctions, such as that the member state not in compliance would be
required to examine the asylum application in an accelerated procedure, and
that the applicant would not be entitled to common reception conditions
other than emergency health care.1 47
It is, therefore, not surprising that attempts to secure formulaic sharing
mechanisms by way of quotas to be imposed based on objective criteria such
as GNP and population, as in the more recent EU formulation, have so far
have been unsuccessful. Moreover, in the historical experience of mass
migration, where quota assignments have in fact achieved significant success,
it has been only where the quotas were negotiated on an ad hoc basis
between states, taking some significant account of where migrants chose to
move, as in the Indochinese and Central American migrations.148
In sum, quota systems share the fatal flaw of divorce from particularized
state interest and migrant choice. In turning management on "burden
sharing" between states, quota systems simply ignore particularized state
interest and migrant motivation. But, as well demonstrated in the European
crisis, governments simply will not comply with mandated quotas they have
not themselves negotiated state qua state, and the migrants will do their best
to avoid mandated "legal" pathways that will not get them where they
choose to go. It follows, to the great misfortune of the migrants and
governments alike, that smuggler networks become a dominant course for
immigration to Europe.
146. Dublin IV Proposal, supra note 12, at art. 4.
147. Id. at art. 5.
148. See Schuck, supra note 101.
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Institutionalization and collective determination of refugee management
can follow a different course. A collectively designed and administered
system could provide more predictable outcomes for governments and
migrants-shared benefits and lower costs and risks, as the most well
considered studies have demonstrated.149
Management of refugee flow must be distinguished from other cross
border phenomenon, such as the flow of capital, goods, and services.
Because mass migration is about the cross-border flow of human beings, it
simply cannot be managed effectively and in compliance with international
refugee law and humanitarian and human rights law by ignoring the interests
and motivation of the human beings and different governments whose vital
concerns are affected.
2.

Matching

Systemic "matching" of migrants and host states is an alternative
methodology that can overcome the failings of distribution by quotas and
can be utilized in conjunction with voluntarily pledging. There are
collective distributional schemes proposed that do incorporate the need to
account for migrant expression to be relocated to destinations, while
respecting state control of immigration. These schemes for "matching"
have seen limited adoption for the durable solution of resettlement but merit
50
greater attention.o
There is now considerable "matching" literature along the following lines;
the individuals to be resettled rank all potentially desirable locations and are
assigned their preferences through a random ordering in the nature of a
lottery in relation to available destinations and the preferences of the states
involved. The schemes may build in mechanisms to adjust between host
states for costs and benefits of hosting migrants. The essential concept,
however, is to "match" migrant preferences with prospective host countries
ranked per objective measures of capacity for integration of migrants, such
as wealth and population density of the prospective host countries. Unlike
quota systems that allocate persons based exclusively on a generalized
formula to achieve "equity" among states and thereby "burden sharing,"
matching considers the particularized preferences of states and of the
migrants.
A matching system allows states and migrants to submit a list of
preferences reflecting both objective and subjective factors, particularized
for each state and each migrant: for migrants, most importantly where they
wish to be located, and for states, what migrants they would prefer based on
factors such as skills, educational levels, and cultural affinity. A computer
algorithm is then used to match migrants with states such that no state and
149. See Hathaway, supra note 5.
150. See HOUSE OF COMMONS
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migrant would prefer to break their match. Conducting matches in this way
gives migrants the opportunity to satisfy their self-defined interests,
removing incentives to circumvent the system, while empowering the
governments involved to prioritize their perception of national interest in
volunteering placements and protection.'
A well-designed matching system can encourage parties to participatenot flee-the system.15 2 A primary purpose, and indeed outcome, of a welldesigned matching system is the revealing of each parties' true preferences,
which in turn gives each party an incentive to do their best to attract the
matches they find most preferable. In other words, a well-designed
matching system that respects migrant preferences can also alter a state's
incentive from the deterrence of migrants, to attraction of migrants. States
being able to influence who is resettled to their territory incentivizes them to
be attractive to preferential groups of migrants so that those migrants will
wish to match with that state. 53 To the extent that incentive is conjoined
with centralized funding incentivizing states to accept migrants, success in
matching becomes even more likely.
The studies of matching systems give strong support for the proposition
that a matching system, though not perfectly accommodating preferences,
can be designed to make the system attractive enough that migrants will
want to participate, and will not resort to illegal means for resettlement.
Through matching, states would gain better control over who settles in their
151. Of key concern to designers of matching systems is that parties will attempt to manipulate
pre-determined matching algorithms by lying about their preferences or by lying about the
information the system uses for evaluation and matching. The latter problem is solved by using
non-manipulable or independently-verifiable criteria, such as language skills or simple rankorder lists.
152. ALVIN E. ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT-AND WHY: THE NEw EcONOMICS OF
MATCHMAKING AND MARKET DESIGN, 165 - 67, (Eamon Dolan & Mariner Books eds., 2016).
A matching system viable for migrants should include a framework of incentives that ensures, so
far as practicable, that their preferences will receive due attention; e.g. lowering the requisite
residence period for qualified beneficiaries of international protection to be eligible for longterm residence status, and therefore, rights of association and employment, as recommended by
the European Parliament during consultations with the Commission. See European
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
standards for the qualification of Third-country nationals or stateless persons eligible for
subsidiary protection and for the content of protection granted and amending Council
Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents, COM (2016) 467, 13 July 2016, Articles 15 and 17(1) of the
Refugee Convention.
153. There are also various solutions for the race to the bottom concern whereby a state might
avoid receiving refugees though various measures of discouragement such as rights abuse, to be
dissuaded through penalties or payments as to unavailability. But, such proposals always break
down on the challenge of enforcement, as evident in the frustration of the European
Commission in imposing its will on recalcitrant governments, most apparent in the refusal of
Hungary to allow any influx, and the increasing resistance of all European governments faced
with the political push-back pressed by right wing nationalist politics.
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territory, and migrants would gain better choice, with lesser risk as to where
they settle.
The system can be designed to allow migrants to apply for what they see
as the best fit for protection, yet allow countries to compete to secure the
number of migrants they are willing to accept. Matching also comports well
with the efficiencies to be gained through joint processing of applications
per standardized procedures. Matching thereby affords the opportunity to
employ uniform standards, such as non-discrimination as to ethnicity,
religion, gender, and sexual orientation, yet respond to realities of cultural
difference, employment, and social affinity.
"Matching" has proven its merits in other contexts. These include, for
example, matching students with schools and matching medical personnel
with the specialized employment needs of health care. Though the systems
are not always as efficient or fair as promised, they are generally evaluated as
having achieved the objective of maximizing preferences for both sides of the
"match. "154
For management of mass migration, matching has been employed only on
a very limited basis.'55 Matching, however, is of merit for management of
mass migration because it can be focused so directly on the preference
dynamics of migrant choice and state interest. It is also most consistent with
the freedom of choice provisions of the Refugee Convention.156 Matching,

fitting comfortably within and being supportive of established international
refugee law, can thereby provide legitimacy for migration management. 57
Seen through the lens of maximizing reconciliation of state interest and
refugee choice, "matching" ranks high as a feature of mass migration
management that should be considered for employment to achieve maximal
correlation and reconciliation of state interest and migrant choice. Its
154. There is a considerable body of experience and study exposing both strengths and
weaknesses, and how best to design a system. In particular, the efficiency and fairness of a

matching system depends on assuring adequate information and simplification of procedures for
participants to make successful matches. For related critique, see study of matching as it has
operated for the New York City school system, The Broken Promise of Choice in New York City
High Schools, THE N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2017.
155. See HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY RESEARCH, supra note 150.
156. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 26, supra note 141, 189 U.N.T.S. at
172.
157. "[T]here is no requirement in the Convention that a refugee seek protection in the
country nearest her home, or even in the first state to which she flees. Nor is it requisite that a
claimant travel directly from her country of first asylum to the state in which she intends to seek

durable protection." The prevailing view is that the universal scope of post-Protocol refugee
law effectively allows most refugees to choose for themselves the country in which they will
claim refugee status. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE
STATUS, 31, (Cambridge ed., 1991) (quoting Chief Justice Lufty of the Canadian Federal
Court). For a contrary view rejecting right of choice, relegating the asylum seeker to seeking
asylum in a "first country of asylum" or "safe third county" as reflected in the EU Directives
constituting Dublin III and the proposed Dublin IV, see HELENE LAMBERT, SEEKING ASYLUM;
COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 91, 98 (Dordrecht,

Martinus, Nijhoff, eds., 1995).
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promise is a unique potential for accommodating state control over
immigration and resettlement, while maximizing migrant choice to move
within legal limits.
B.

STATE INTEREST AND MIGRANT CHOICE IN THE
EXTERNALIZATION OF MIGRANT MANAGEMENT

Management of mass migration can involve either domestic policies for
protection, resettlement, and integration, or policies employing a variety of
forms of externalized response-that is, procedures and programs for
reversing or stymying migrant flow. These tools for mass migration
management may be adopted exclusively, or in any combination. In this
regard, the EU/Greece/Turkey model is a hybrid, composed of temporary
protection and some measure of resettlement. But, EU policy may evolve,
the different forms of externalization have become increasingly the
politically preferred path for the EU, as exemplified by the EU's recent
announcement of major aid programs to engage states of origin to prevent
movement to Europe.
As the impacts of mass migration are felt in states of transit and
destination, as in the current context of the EU, externalization means
enhancing border controls and other forms of push-back and prevention,
notwithstanding the fundamental principle of non-refoulement. This
includes, on the one hand erection of border barriers and interceptions at
sea, endangering migrant lives,58 and on the other, development assistance
ostensibly to discourage migration.
Any form of externalization of the mass migration challenge is naturally
suspect, which is commonly revealed by the NGO community as
constituting either internment or forced repatriation. "Aid" as an
externalized response may all too easily degenerate to mean bribery to
officials of states of origin to stem the flow, but camouflaged as economic
and social development funding. But, there are also truly ambitious and
promising schemes of migrant empowerment within the context of
temporary protection. The lens of migrant choice and state interest reveals
the difference between externalization that serves constructive mass
migration management and that which does not.
1.

Push-back and Border Controls

Externalization in its most primitive form-by push-back and border
blockage-does not accomplish effective management. Indeed, it brings
with it the dark and destructive consequence that is undeniable-generation
and enhancement of smuggler networks that exploit and abuse migrant
populations. The value of the human smuggling business is now estimated,
158. See generally Jenna Belhumeur, Libyan Coastguard Opened Fire at Refugee Boats: NGOs,
(May 25, 2017), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/libyan-coast
guard-opens-fire-migrant-boats-ngos-170525100451559.html.

ALJAZEERA,
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in the European context alone, to amount to billions of dollars per annum.
In its more organized form, it has even developed features akin to insurance
and bonding. Such irregular migration, through payment, occurs in many
forms when people have few if any alternatives for achieving personal
security. If controls such as visa regimes and carrier sanctions remove choice
other than to enter illegally, that is what the desperate will do, and that is
what feeds the smugglers.
As mass migration reaches "crisis" proportions, it is perhaps only to be
expected that the governments impacted will try to deter and diminish the
flow. This was the course of events in the four mass migration episodes
discussed above. In the current European crisis, we see a similar political
response that was reflected in the Brexit vote in England, resurgence of right
wing parties throughout Europe, and other expressions of xenophobia,
generating new efforts at policing migrants, visa restrictions, and carrier
sanctions to staunch the flow. Such programs have been developed both as
joint international endeavors, as through the institutionalization of maritime
interdiction by Frontex, and by individual states through national border
controls. But because a large proportion of the migrant population chooses
to move despite the risks imposed, blockage, as a longer-term policy
emphasis, invariably proves counterproductive-not only enhancing
irregular movement and smuggling, but also undermining the values of
human rights and humanitarian concern embodied in the Refugee
Convention and the applicable regional law of the EU.
2.

"Hotspots"

The Turkey/EU/Greece deal was promoted as a scheme that would
transcend the risks involved in the mass migration to Europe, while
affirming refugee rights and migrant protection. The EU Commission
proposals of 2016 presented the deal as a methodology for registration and
identification of asylum seekers arriving at EU's external borders-both for
relieving the pressure on the front-line states and providing a "legal"
pathway for resettlement and integration.159 It was to be a model for
management of mass migration with the objectives of swiftly identifying,
registering, and fingerprinting migrants, primarily to support relocations
and returns.1 60
The failure of the EU/Greece/Turkey deal to satisfy the mandates of
international refugee law and European law, is echoed in the failure of this
model. It has been distinguished not by relocation and repatriation, but by
profound denial of migrant choice and trivialization of state interest. Media
reports and the protests of NGOs have presented the international
community with what is the real picture: tens of thousands of migrants
159. For a detailed report, see Aspasia Papadopoulou et al., The Implementation of the Hotspots in
Italy and Greece, Eur. Council for Refugees and Exiles, http://www.ecre.org/study-of-eu-hot
spot-approach-reveals-serious-challenges-in-greece-anditaly/.
160. See id.
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trapped in prolonged detention without any meaningful access to asylum,
struggling with minimal physical and informational resources and
abbreviated appeal procedures, resulting for the most part in expedited
returns and relatively few resettlements.161
State interest has been particularly ill-served for the front-line state of
Greece, which bears the brunt of the model. Migrant choice is made a
mockery by inadequate infrastructure at all levels where the relevant legal
norms of refugee law, human rights, and humanitarian law are supposed to
apply.162 All the evidence is that the "hotspot" model, promoted as a hybrid
of policing and protection, has morphed into a minor variation on what is
essentially a push-back strategy. EU officials claim success as the flow to
Greece has diminished, yet generally ignore the unintended dire
consequences of inadequate protection of migrants confined in Greece and
Turkey and the generation of alternative irregular movement on which the
smuggler networks capitalize.163

3.

Camps

Migrant camps are the most significant externalization of migrant
management in terms of the number of individuals subsisting within
frameworks of international and national legal authority. The camps vary
dramatically in the limitations imposed on migrant choice, ranging from
status indistinguishable from criminal detention, to significant enablement
and empowerment of migrants. But in general, the past mass migration
management reality of camps has been largely one of isolation and charity,
not empowerment of migrant choice. That was true even for the relatively
successful managements that comprised the CPA for Indochina and the
Central American flow, with the migrants essentially in "holding" status
pending political negotiation of resettlements.
Today, the great majority of migrants are in "protracted situations," which
the UNHCR defines as pending for more than five years for 25,000 or more
people.164 More than two-dozen of these "protracted situations" have been
maintained around the world, many for more than twenty years, some
holding tens of thousands of migrants, limiting further freedom of
movement and affording little or no education or other means of
advancement.165 Indeed, the norm of contemporary mass migration
management is that the UNHCR mandate for protection and assimilation
has evolved largely to one of isolation and charity, leaving migrants little or
161. As of May 12, 2017, 16,163 persons had been resettled to twenty-one countries, with most
of the recent resettlements being from Turkey. Eur. Commission Press Release, Relocation and
Resettlement: Commission calls on all Member States to deliver and meet obligations, (May 16,
2017).
162. See Section II, above.
163. See generally Eur. Commission, supra note 161.
164. See NICHOLAS CRAWFORD ET AL., PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT: UNCERTAIN PATHS TO
SELF-RELIANCE IN EXILE

11 (2015).

165. See id. at 1.
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no hope for anything better.166 This is the "normal" that epitomizes the
externalization of migrant management, whereby separate state
responsibility is minimized and avoided, and migrant choice is limited to the
choice of bare subsistence. Moreover, the mixing of substantial aid with lack
of migrant empowerment breeds corruption of the worst sort, depriving
migrants even of bare subsistence where crime gangs dominate.167
Maximization of migrant choice and sovereign interest would dictate a far
different "normal." And there is indeed good evidence there can be a new
"normal" for migrant camps that pays due respect to national immigration
control, yet better serves the mixed nature of contemporary mass migration.
Moreover, that new normal can include not only "refugees" as defined by
the refugee Convention, but all migrants requiring "temporary protection."
There are currently several migrant camps that have evolved in the
direction of integrating camp life, whether temporary or long-term, with the
proximate indigenous community. Principal examples are the camps
operating in Uganda, Jordan, and Turkey, where migrant situations range
from emergency relief to protracted settlements, both rural and urban.
Migrants in these camps have been engaged with the local communities
where they are situated, transitioning from total dependence on
international aid, to become consumers, producers, buyers, sellers,
employers, and employees.168 Jordan's Zaatari Refugee Camp, which is now
a community of approximately 80,000169 persons, is particularly notable for
166. Those granted asylum are a small portion of those who receive "temporary protection;"
most migrants being caught in permanent limbo in refugee camps. See generally Addressing
Protracted Displacement, infra note 125, at 6. There is reluctance to grant employment and
residence rights to those with a "temporary" status or whose asylum claims are pending. Most
migrants' options are temporary or no protection because only a small fraction of migrants are
granted asylum. The EU decision in September 2015 to relocate 160,000 asylum-seekers from
Greece to Italy within two years, therefore, resulted in only 5,651 relocations after one year,
with a highly unequal distribution. Migrants have an advantage where there is proximity
allowing safe repatriation, and cultural commonalities rather than profound differences, (e.g.
Syrians in Turkey of shared Islamic faith, compare Sunni vs. Shite with historic tribal rivalries,
and treatment of women).
167. For example, in early 2017, Italian police arrested sixty-eight people in the southern
region of Calabria, including a priest and the local head of a Roman Catholic association that
ran the Sant'Anna migration center in the town of Isola Capo Rizzoto, one of the largest camps
in Italy. The charges, among other offenses, were involvement in organized crime, extortion,
misappropriation of public funds, and fraud. Many of those arrested were said to belong to one
of the most violent crime groups in Italy. Of the 103 million pounds received by the migration
center from the EU between 2006 and 2015, it was estimated 36 million pounds were stolen.
Part of the alleged fraud was simply to let migrants go hungry instead of providing the
subsidized meals. Jacopo Barigazzi, Politico, EU Asylum Reform Deadlocked, p. 3, http://www
.politico.eu/article/europe-refugees-eu-asylum-reform-deadlocked/.
168. See ALEXANDER BETTS, LOUISE BLOOM, ET AL., REFUGEE ECONOMIES: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (2017). For numerous examples of these achievements on
a country-by-country basis, see Addressing ProtractedDisplacement:A Frameworkfor Development
Humanitarian Cooperation, A Think Piece Drawing on collaboration Between OCHA, UNDP,
UNHCR, UNICEF WFT, and the World Banks, Dec. 2015.
169. Syrian Regional Refugee Response, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (July 3, 2017).
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what has been achieved in maximizing migrant choice and state interest.
There, migrants have been integrated in work in a special economic zone
enjoying tariff reductions from the EU and are given vocational training and
support from the Jordanian government, which itself benefits from the
greater labor force that the migrant population provides. These camps have
generated World Bank support and NGO's support, as well as support from
multi-national corporations such as Walmart and IKEA.170 The result is
migrant empowerment, conjoined with economic benefits for the host state.
The camp also provides jobs for Jordanian nationals, thereby building
human bonds between Jordanian citizens and migrants as a basis for the
more durable solution of integration.
So, what we are seeing in the more constructive camp programs is
significant movement away from the paradigm of maintenance until
resettlement or repatriation, to innovative engagement of migrant choice
and national interest, affording durable solutions, paradoxically, by way of
"temporary protection." It has come to constitute a new paradigm that no
longer ignores the reality of "protracted situations." It affords migrants
choices other than the stark alternatives of the risk of irregular movement or
no movement at all. It allows for migrant advancement, yet does not
foreclose voluntary return when the necessary political resolution allowing
repatriation may be achieved.
The relative success of these experiments in integration of migrant camps
with local resources and needs bespeaks the value of strengthening, through
financing and technical assistance, the human resources within the camps
and national resources for engagement. This will vary considerably, of
course, per political and geographic circumstance. To the extent such
constructive development within the camps is made part of a regional
scheme accommodating the national interests involved, this engagement
paradigm can be even more effective, as was the regional migration
management developed for Indochina and Central America. The focus on
migrant choice is what makes it promising, creating a capacity for migrant
leadership, encouraging respect for local laws and customs, discouraging
illegal or anti-social behavior, and contributing to the welfare of host
communities.
It should be noted that this camp/integration paradigm, while new in key
respects, is wholly consistent with the Refugee Convention. The clear
thrust of the Convention was not dependency, though dependency has come
to characterize most mass migration management. The substantive
provisions of the Convention are guarantees of social and economic rights as
the means to achieve constructive integration and other forms of selfempowerment for refugees. These rights cannot be realized when migrants
are caged and warehoused in camps. The Refugee Convention was not and
is not a charity-based prescription for management. It is a mandate for
170. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Camp Planning Standards, availableat https://
emergency.unhcr.org/entry/45582/camp-planning-standards-planned-settlements.
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empowerment and integration, respectful of sovereign interest. This new
camp model, both for refugees and for migrants more generally, can be a
paradigm for successful achievement of that mandate.
4.

External Development Strategies

Economic and social development aid focused on countries of origin of
migrants has long been seen as a tool to diminish mass migration.171 This is
the aspect of migration management through externalization most attuned
to refugee choice because improvement of living conditions in the states of
origin, it would seem, can significantly diminish incentives to move.
But, this thesis is not without critique. The critique is that improved
standards of living in states of origin can generate more, not less, migration,
by providing those who choose to migrate with the economic wherewithal to
do so and to pay smugglers. This critique is often joined with the
observation that it is not economic, but political push factors, that are the
most significant in generating migration, and that political dysfunction,
irrespective of development, is why people will migrate once they have the
means.1 72 The best prescription, it is argued, is therefore not economic
development, but rule of law projects, such as legal and judicial
independence development, and public finance management.1 73 But as for
mass migration generally, whatever the relative significance of economic
deprivation or political instability, either thesis confirms that the appropriate
measure of migration management is how it will impact individual migrant
choice to stay or flee.
Development as a means for externalization has been made pre-eminent
in the context of the current European crisis by promulgation of "The New
Migration Partnership Framework" (MPF) endorsed by the European
Council in June of 2016, for coordinated structured cooperation addressing
root causes. The plan is to offer support for trade and development in
exchange for states of origin and transit developing disincentives to
migration.174 This is to include states of origin across Africa and the Middle
East assisting in return, repatriation, and reintegration, and fighting against
171. See Alexander Betts, Development Assistance and Refugees: Towards a North-South Grand
Bargain?, Forced Migration Policy Briefing 2, Refugee Studies Centre, (2009), 11-12, (building
on the Hathaway and Neve concept of "common but differentiated responsibility" see James C.
Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making InternationalRefugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposalfor
Collectivized and Solution-OrientedProtection (1997) 10 HARVARD HuMAN RIGHTs J. 115).
172. See Jonas Gamso & Farhod Yuldashev, Development Aid May Not Deter Migration, But
Governance Aid Will, NEws DEEPLY (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/
community/2016/11/30/development-aid-may-not-deter-migration-but-governance-aid-will.
173. See e.g., Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher eds., Refugees in InternationalRelations (2011)
https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2016/11/30/development-aid-may-notdetr-migration-but-governance-aid-will.
174. See Communicationfrom the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council and the European Investment Bank on Establishinga New PartnershipFramework with Third
Countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM (2016) 385 Final (June 7, 2016).
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smugger networks.171 The scheme is a mix of positive and negative
incentives, tailored to each potential country of origin.176 Migration
management is, thus, addressed as necessarily connecting the countries of
origin, transit, and destination in coordinated policy.
Compacts with states of origin are the cornerstones of the Partnership
Framework. The compacts are to be packages of financial aid and policy
elements tailored to individual countries' needs to reduce the influx of
irregular migrants to EU member states.177 Under the Framework, between
2016 and 2020, the prospect offered is that approximately C8,000,000,000
will be invested to achieve short-term objectives, and potentially,
C62,000,000,000 will be invested to achieve long-term objectives17s The
plan is an aspect of the European External Investment Plan published by the
European Commission in September 2016 outlining a better, harmonized,
and more substantial role of the EU in economic advancement of the
developing world, and including private sector investment, to boost jobs and
growth in connection with the New Partnership Framework.179
But, seen through the lens of migrant choice and state interest of Europe,
the good governance question remains critical. There is naturally a high
degree of governmental corruption in migrant generating areas, poor
governance being pre-eminent as a push factor. Moreover, inherent in any
implementation of the Framework is the overarching concern that
development not be a euphemism for "containment," which, in its most
degenerate form, is simply bribery for repression of migrant rights. The risk
for Europe is that the "Framework" may become another commitment of
international aid, whereby corrupt foreign officials in states of origin and
transit divert to their own interests what was investment intended to achieve
real improvement in quality of life for their citizens. Moreover, the
"Framework" can work against Europe's long-term interests by
strengthening regimes Europe does not have an interest in supporting.so
So, constructive implementation will require a high priority for transparency
and anti-corruption controls, such as have been developed and refined by
international development institutions that commonly confront the cureresistant global plague of corruption.-1
175. See E. Zalan, Commission Communication on Establishinga New Partnership Framework with
Third Countries under the European Agenda on Migration, COM (2016) 385 Final (June 7, 2016);
EU to Make Aid Conditional on Help with Migrants, EU OBSERVOR (June 7, 2016).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 12.
179. European Commission, Strengthening European Investment for jobs and Growth: Towards a
Second Phase of the European Fundfor Strategic Investments and a New European ExternalInvestment
Plan (COM/2016/581) at 6 (Sept. 14, 2016), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/deal-content/en/TXT/
?uri=celex:52016DC0581.
180. See Carrera. S., et al., EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A
Model to Follow?, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, No. 87, Jan. 2016.
181. See generally Eur. Commission, supra note 161.
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Examined through the lens of maximization of refugee choice and state
interest, the preferred policy emphasis becomes clear. Aid to a state of
migration origin as a containment strategy, whereby the funds will flow for
enhancement of border controls and detention, is revealed as
counterproductive. Without more, governments of the states of origin, who
are often complicit in generating the flow, by failing to satisfy basic security
concerns of their peoples, will not be reformed, but will be further corrupted
by funding conditional on stemming the flow. Economic aid for border
control is not a conditionality that can be controlled by donor states.
Sovereignty of the states of origin will prevail to the detriment of migrant
choice, and both national and regional social stability. Funding to prevent a
population from fleeing, predictably, will be redirected to those in control,
and for policing, that only enhances the pressure on a population seeking to
flee political persecution and the other insecurities that generate mass
migration. What is required, as maximization of other states' interest and
migrant choice would dictate, is aid conditional on improvement in
protection of human rights of the potential migrant population, affording
that citizenry a voice in governance, as basis for hope for a better life, at
home. That hope, of a better life at home, is surely the greatest disincentive
to migrant flow.
V.

Conclusion

The phenomena of mass migration will continue to test the regulatory
resources of international law and administration. Certainly, successful
management is beyond the aegis of national sovereignty. Achieving personal
security for any migrant population is by its very nature a matter for
international management, in that mass migration impacts, at the least, and
collectively, the countries of origin, transit, and destination. Today, in our
globalized world, mass migrant management has become a matter of greater
collateral impacts and global concern. But, while it is essential to recognize
mass migration as a principal international challenge of our time, it is also
essential to identify the specific and individual determinants of why and how
migrants move in a temporal frame that overwhelms national immigration
law and process. The necessary focus, as the historical experience and
diverse management strategies all demonstrate, must be the separate state
interests involved and the choices made by the migrants themselves. It is
only in this view that focus obtains that successful management can be
achieved.
Migrant choice and state interest should, therefore, be the lens within
which to evaluate each alternative migration management strategy for the
future. Whether management is internalized through the "durable
solutions" of resettlement, integration, and international protection pending
repatriation, or whether management is externalized, through border
controls, refugee camps, or international development programs, migrant
choice and state interest must be the focus for the framing of policy. It is the
only management project that is both pragmatic and principled-consistent
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with international refugee law, human rights law, and humanitarian lawthat can protect migrants from abuse and empower their integration or
repatriation.
The foundation of international refugee law, the 1951 Convention, was
adopted in forthright recognition that national sovereignty would dominate
migration law and policy, and that any realistic management of mass
migration must acknowledge what migrants will choose to do in seeking
physical and economic security. It is also the implicit insight of the
Convention that the rights to be realized must be reconciled with sovereign
authority in a world of nation-states. Most simply described, the
Convention is an articulation of the rights critical to realizing migrant
choice, correlated with state interest to ensure national and regional social
stability in adjusting to mass migration. The Convention, seen in proper
perspective, is therefore a constitutional document, embodying the objective
of any good constitution-to provide a framework for principled and
positive social evolution.
The negation of values of human rights and humanitarian concern we see
in so many aspects of the international response to migrant flow is not
inevitable. Guided by the lens of state interest and migrant choice, we can
understand how to achieve better legal management for temporary
protection, asylum determination, resettlement, and integration. That lens
also instructs that punishment and deprivation of basic human rights result
in the worst consequences for mass migration: irregular movement, the
global business of human trafficking, and, ironically, financial support for
regimes responsible for the poor governance that generates mass migration.
While it is, of course, true that effective management can be achieved only
within the limits of political feasibility, what is politically feasible will vary,
ever-shifting in relation to social conflict and security issues. Therefore,
effective management through legal process requires examining each episode
of mass influx to maximize the correlation of migrant choice and state
interest in context. The current displacement and detention of hundreds of
thousands of migrants who would qualify for asylum, or at least temporary
protection-well within the capacities of European states and other statessimply demonstrates the gross failure to accomplish this essential task.
That is the broader tragedy of mass migration today, beyond the appalling
picture of the body of a migrant child washed up on a beach. The facts are,
that most migrants are condemned long term, if not for their entire
remaining lives, to internationally organized detention, subsisting without
hope, at the mercy of political push-back without productive engagement.
The outsourcing of border controls is no solution, providing third countries
of origin and transit with increased bargaining power, often to the advantage
of regimes festering and feeding on human rights abuse. It is ultimately
ironic and counterproductive, that policies designed to bar the flow, create
and support the very insecurity that generates mass migration, amplifying
irregular movement and human trafficking.
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The Refugee Convention is a design for refugee empowerment. It is not
the deeply flawed but dominant charity model that management of mass
migration has come to be for the great majority of migrants. The
Convention envisions guarantees of social and economic rights as means to
achieve self-reliance, such as access to education and the right to seek work
as the essentials for meaningful migrant choice, but to be realized only
insofar as possible within legal limits of assuring state interest in social
stability, prosperity, and national security. The Convention is, in other
words, a manifesto to maximize a beneficial relationship of migrant choice
and state interest.
There is no escape from international responsibility for the management
of mass migration. Even if there were not available a principled and legal
prescription instructing success, states still would be significantly impacted
by the migrations generated from other states where migrants' survival is at
issue and would have to find some form of resolution. Whether the driver is
civil conflict, global climate change, related economic deprivation, or
governmental failure and corruption, sudden surges in migration that
overwhelm standard state immigration process will occur. Finding guidance
for successful international management through the lens of migrant choice
and state interest can serve to secure the shared values of international
community. After all, mass migration management, at its best, is about
human beings managing their communal existence on this planet to their
mutual advantage. Seen in the light of migrant choice and state interest, the
better course for action can become clear.
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